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ABSTRACT
This dissertation conducts empirical examinations o f a new normative
(equilibrium) model, the Gain-Loss Pricing Model (GLPM) o f Lin (1999a), in which
loss aversion is intuitively incorporated into investors’ portfolio decisions. In this
equilibrium, the risk-retum relation is based on the tradeoff between the expected
market-related gain o f an asset and its expected market-related loss. In addition to
its economic intuition, the new model is shown to be more robust than the meanvariance-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
This dissertation consists o f two essays. The first essay examines the
empirical power o f the GLPM using NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. This testing
framework has a high testing standard that investigates whether there is a systematic
component o f asset returns left unexplained by the new model and places no
restrictions on the sampling distribution of the statistic. The test results indicate that
no more than 3% o f sample stocks are mispriced according to the model during any
given five-year test period in the 1948-1997 sample period. We also find that the
mispricing in small size portfolios is not severe. The evidence implies that most
sample firms are priced such that their risk-retum relation is consistent with the
GLPM.
Based on these testing results, the second essay proposes a long-term
performance evaluation framework. This framework is capable o f mitigating the
skewness problem o f long-term abnormal return distributions and avoiding the
aggregation problems in many long-term performance tests. The specification o f the
long-term performance is evaluated using samples o f randomly selected

V
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NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks and simulated random event dates. Simulation
results show that the long-term performance evaluation framework based on the
GLPM is well-specified.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), researchers have
identified a number o f anomalies in asset prices.1 The anomalies are inconsistent with
the joint hypotheses that the market is efficient and that the C APM is a correct
model. While it is possible that the market may not be perfectly efficient, many
researchers, including Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), Jegadeesh (1992), and Fama
and French (1992, 1993, 1996), argue that the CAPM is misspecified. Furthermore,
on theoretical grounds, Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) and Jarrow and Madan (1997)
show that CAPM pricing allows arbitrage opportunities in any market with traded
options and suggest that the CAPM has serious theoretical drawbacks.
Recently, Lin (1999a) proposes a new equilibrium asset pricing model, the
Gain-Loss Pricing Model (GLPM), which is shown to be more robust than the meanvariance-based CAPM. In addition, the GLPM intuitively incorporates loss aversion
into equilibrium asset pricing. It is well known that economic agents are averse to
losses when they make risky choice involving monetary outcomes (Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman(1986, 1991, 1992)).
Since the GLPM has economic intuition and robustness, two questions
naturally arise. First, can it empirically explain asset returns? Currently, empirical
tests based on normative (equilibrium) asset pricing models have not been able to
provide convincing results. On the other hand, while positive (empirically based)
1 The anomalies include the price-caming-ratio effect (Basu. 1977). the January- effect (Kcim,
1983). the size effect (Banz. 1981: Reinganum. 1981). market ovcrrcaction (De Bondt and Thaler.
1985). market undcrrcaction (Jegadeesh and Titman. 1993). and others.

1
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asset pricing models tend to fit return data better, they are ad hoc in nature. As
Ferson and Harvey (1999) state, “empirical asset pricing is in a state o f turmoil.”
Their statement seems to call for studies that can empirically show that asset returns
follow a well-specified theoretical model.
The second question is whether the GLPM is useful in evaluating long-term
performance. Recent empirical studies document a number of anomalies in long
term performance.2 The empirical results bring forth the resurgence o f the debate
on market efficiency. However, traditional long-term performance studies suffer
from theoretical and empirical difficulties that restrain their usefulness as tests o f the
efficient market hypothesis. Specifically, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that tests
o f market efficiency require a normative (equilibrium) asset pricing model.
According to Loughran and Ritter, “if a positive (empirically based) model is used,
one is not testing market efficiency; instead, one is merely testing whether any
patterns that exist are being captured by other known patterns.” An example o f
positive asset pricing models is the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model.
Furthermore, long-term performance evaluation is sensitive to the asset pricing
model employed (Fama (1998)). Ideally, to accurately evaluate long-term
performance, one needs a well-specified asset pricing model. Therefore, it is
important to know whether the long-term performance evaluation framework based

~ These anomalies include market ovcrrcaction (Dc Bondt and Thaler, 198S), the long-term
undcrpcrTormancc of initial public offerings (Ritter. 1991), market underreaction (Jegadeesh and
Titman. 1993). and the long-term undcrpcrformancc o f seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and
Ritter (1995). Spicss and Aflleck-Gravcs (1995)).

2
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on the normative (equilibrium) GLPM is well-specified. It is, also, o f interest to see
how long-term anomalies behave under the GLPM.
Since the potential contributions o f the GLPM to the finance literature largely
hinge on the above two issues, they warrant careful analysis. For this reason, two
essays in this dissertation are used to address the two issues. The first essay uses the
bootstrap method to investigate the explanatory ability o f the GLPM. The testing
framework used in this essay has a high testing standard emphasizing whether there
is a systematic component of asset returns left unexplained by the GLPM and places
no restrictions on the sampling distribution o f the statistic. The test results indicate
that no more than 3% of sample stocks are mispriced according to the GLPM during
any given five-year test period in the 1948-1997 sample period.
Based on the testing results built in the first essay, the second essay analyzes
the long-term performance evaluation framework based on the GLPM. This study is
in the line with the arguments o f Loughran and Ritter (2000) that long-term
performance evaluation requires a normative (equilibrium) asset pricing model. In
addition, this evaluation framework uses the bootstrap tests on an individual stock
basis to mitigate the skewness problem o f abnormal return distributions and avoid the
aggregation problems in many long-term performance tests. Finally, the specification
of our long-term performance evaluation framework is evaluated using samples of
randomly selected NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks and simulated random event
dates. Our simulation results show that the long-term performance evaluation
framework based on the GLPM is well-specified.

3
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CHAPTER 2
EMPIRICAL ASSET PRICING
IN AN ALTERNATIVE FUNCTIONAL FORM

2.1 Introduction
The message from Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) is loud and clear.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) o f Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and
Mossin (1966) is not capable o f empirically explaining asset returns. Instead, Fama
and French propose size and book-to-market ratio, along with the market portfolio,
as the risk factors that generate asset expected returns. However, there is a
controversy over why size and book-to-market ratio are relevant factors. For one
thing, these two characteristics are not derived from an equilibrium model. Hence,
one may question the a d hoc nature o f the Fama-French three factor model.3 As
more and more studies indicate that characteristics with no exposure to underlying
economic risk factors could be related to asset returns (e.g., Berk (1995), Daniel and
Titman (1997)) and distress appears to have no systematic risk component (Dichev,
1998), the urge to empirically show that asset returns follow a well-specified
theoretical model seems to grow.4 In response to this sentiment, this study proposes
a new test, which allows us to study asset returns in a less restricted empirical
framework, to examine a new equilibrium model that is, on theoretical grounds, more

■
’ A related argument is that the relationship between characteristics and asset returns can be due to
data snooping, e.g.. MacKinlay (1995).
' The robustness of size and book-to-market ratio as pervasive factors is also challenged. Knez and
Ready (1997) find that size loses its explanatory power when the one percent most extreme
observ ations arc trimmed each month. Loughran (1997) documents that book-to-market ratio is not
a determinant of asset returns outside o f January for large firms.

4
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robust than the CAPM. The test results indicate that empirical asset pricing is largely
consistent with the new model.
The CAPM has traditionally served as the backbone o f empirical asset
pricing. Despite its popularity, the mean-variance preferences underlying the CAPM
have some theoretical drawbacks. For example, Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) and
Jarrow and Madan (1997) illustrate that, under mean-variance preferences, arbitrage
opportunities can exist in markets trading options. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and
Heath (1997) demonstrate that investors with mean-variance preferences may reject
a free lottery ticket. Leland (1999) shows that if market portfolio returns are
independently and identically distributed, then the market portfolio is mean-variance
inefficient. Lin (1999b) demonstrates that, under mean-variance pricing, investors in
equilibrium can increase the values o f their portfolios by giving up ex ante cash flows
in states where the market portfolio has a sufficiently large return. These drawbacks
suggest that the CAPM has limitations and could be invalid under no restriction on
the upside potential.
Empirical evidence on risk aversion also suggests that the variance o f
portfolio returns does not fully characterize economic agents’ perception o f and
behavior toward risk. A number of studies o f risky choice involving monetary
outcomes have documented that economic agents are averse to losses. For example,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986, 1991, 1992) find
that economic agents are much more sensitive to losses than to gains. This lossaverse view is also advocated by Fishbum (1977) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995).

5
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Recently, Lin (1999a) has shown that loss aversion can be incorporated into
equilibrium asset pricing. Under the assumption that investors become more averse
to losses when they expect to lose more, Lin derives an equilibrium asset pricing
model, the Gain-Loss Pricing Model (GLPM). This model has two theoretical
advantages over the CAPM. First, it does not have the above theoretical drawbacks
o f the CAPM. Second, it is valid for all financial assets at the Pareto-optimal
allocation o f risk. Furthermore, the GLPM is mathematically equivalent to the
Mean-First Lower Partial Moment (MLPM(1)) model o f Bawa and Lindenberg
(1977) and hence incorporates the intuitive appeal of downside risk measures.5
Since the GLPM has economic intuition and robustness, a question naturally
arises: can it empirically explain asset returns? To answer this question, we propose
a new testing framework and use the bootstrap method to examine whether the
pricing o f U.S. common stocks is consistent with the GLPM. With the use o f the
bootstrap confidence intervals, this testing framework allows asset pricing tests to be
conducted on an individual asset or portfolio basis and places no distributional
restrictions on the sampling distribution o f the statistic. Because tests are applied to
each sample asset, this testing framework allows us to address an empirical question,
what percentage o f common stocks are priced according to the theory? This
question has practical and empirical implications to the study o f asset pricing,
performance evaluation, and investment strategies because the smaller the number of

5 Since the GLPM is mathematically equivalent to the MLPM(l) model, the empirical results
obtained in this study also support the MLPM(1) model.

6
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assets mispriced according to the theory, the less feasible it is to exploit mispricing
opportunities.
Our test results show that, during the 1948-1997 sample period, the
maximum rejection rates o f the null hypothesis o f no mispricing in the 10 five-year
test periods are 3 .07% and 8.18% for the 1% and 5% levels of significance,
respectively. Given the allowable level o f the theoretical type-I errors and the
randomness in the level o f the type-I errors, the results imply that no more than 3%
o f sample stocks are mispriced in any o f the five-year test periods. The mean
rejection rates o f the null hypothesis under the GLPM, 2.03% and 7.04%, are only
about 1% and 2% away from the 1% and 5% levels o f significance, respectively. In
addition, the rejection o f the null hypothesis is not severe in small size portfolios.
Overall, it appears that the GLPM does a good job o f explaining stock returns in
terms of their risk-retum relation.
The remainder o f this essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces
the GLPM and its relationship with the MLPM(1) model. Section 2.3 describes the
data. Section 2.4 illustrates the testing framework and the bootstrap method.
Section 2.5 provides empirical results. Section 2.6 concludes this essay.
2.2 The Gain-Loss Pricing Model (GLPM)
This section first introduces the GLPM. We then discuss its equivalence to
the MLPM(I) model.
2.2.1 The GLPM
As Greenblatt (1997) intuitively describes, "comparing the risk o f loss in an
investment to the potential gain is what investing is all about." Based on this

7
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intuition, Lin (1999a) proposes that investors have gain-loss utility functions with
the form:
G(Gps, Lps) = W0 Gps- [ l + a f 2 E(Lps)] W0Lpi

(2.1)

where
GPs = (Rps-Rf) if RPs > Rf, and Gps = 0 otherwise;
Lps = -(R ps-R r) if Rps < Rfi and Lps = 0 otherwise;
RpS is the return on portfolio P in state s; WQdenotes initial wealth; R f '\s
the risk-free rate; and a is the loss aversion coefficient with a > 0.
Investors may have different loss aversion coefficients.
The gain-loss utility functional form in (2.1) is bilinear, which has an
empirical basis. In their experimental studies, Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), and Tversky and Kahneman (1986, 1991,
1992) find that individuals making decisions under conditions with uncertain
monetary outcomes exhibit approximately a bilinear gain-loss utility function. The
utility function in (2.1) further assumes that investors become more averse to losses
when they expect to lose more in the investment.6 With a single parameter, a, for
loss aversion, this form o f gain-loss utility is designed to reflect the risk o f loss as the
primary concern o f investors who, by taking risk, expect to be rewarded with
potential gains from investing.

’’ Under this bilinear utility' function, an investor's loss aversion increases when she expects to lose
more from investing, which is intuitively appealing. In contrast, the typical bilinear utility function
assumed in this literature has a constant loss aversion. e.g.. l ’(Rpi. L^) = (Rp,-R /) - aLps (Sharpe.
1998).

8
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Lin (1999a) shows that, in a frictionless, competitive economy, the optimal
investment decision for any investor with the gain-loss utility function involves: (i)
constructing the best risky portfolio with a ratio o f expected gain to expected loss
that is the highest among those that can be constructed in the economy, (ii) investing
in this best risky portfolio until the investor’s marginal rate o f substitution o f
expected gain for expected loss is equal to the ratio o f the expected gain to the
expected loss of the best risky portfolio, and (iii) lending the remaining funds, or
borrowing if insufficient, at the risk-free rate.
He further shows that if investors have homogeneous expectations, then, in
equilibrium, the market portfolio, M, must be the best risky portfolio with the highest
gain-loss ratio and any asset / must be priced such that:

EjMRG.) = E(Gm)
E(MRL.)
E(Lm)
where
MRG, = (R, - Rf) if Rm > /(/and MRG, = 0 otherwise;
MRI^, = - ( R , - R/) if Rm < Rf, and MRL, = 0 otherwise;
Gm = {R„ - Rf) if Rm> R f Gm = 0 otherwise; and
Lm = - {Rm - Rf) if R„ < R f Lm = 0 otherwise.
Equation (2.2) is the gain-loss pricing model (GLPM), which postulates that,
in equilibrium, the ratio of expected market-related gain to expected market-related
loss o f asset /, E(MRG,)/E(MRL,), is equal to the ratio o f expected gain to expected
loss of the market portfolio, E(Gm)/E(Lm). Since the gain-loss ratio of the market

9
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portfolio, n= E{Gm)/E(Lm), is invariant to all assets, the GLPM predicts that the
higher the expected market-related loss o f an asset, the higher the expected marketrelated gain investors requires to compensate for the loss. Thus, under the GLPM,
the gain-loss ratio o f the market portfolio defines the gain-loss tradeoff for individual
assets.
On theoretical grounds, the GLPM is superior to the CAPM in two respects.
First, Lin (1999a) shows that the GLPM results in a positive pricing operator.
Consequently, the GLPM eliminates the arbitrage opportunities arising from the
possibility o f negative prices for call options in the CAPM (Dybvig and Ingersoll
(1982), Jarrow and Madan (1997)). Second, Lin demonstrates that the GLPM holds
before and after the introduction of derivative assets that complete the market. In
contrast, Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show that if enough derivative assets are
added to complete the market, the CAPM would collapse. Given the theoretical
advantages, the focus o f this study is to see how well the GLPM explains empirical
asset returns.
2.2.2 The Relationship between the GLPM and the MLPM(l) Model
Another advantage of the GLPM is that it captures the appeal o f downside
risk measures. To many, a downside risk measure seems more plausible than
variance as a measure o f risk because of its consistency with the way economic
agents actually perceive risk (Markowitz (1959), Mao (1970)). In the following
proposition we prove the mathematical equivalence between the GLPM and the
Mean-first order Low Partial Moment, MLPM(1), model o f Bawa and Lindenberg
(1977).

10
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Proposition: The GLPM is mathematically equivalent to the M LPM (l) Model.
Proof:
The family o f the MLPM models o f Hogan and Warren (1974) and Bawa and
Lindenberg (1977) can be specified as:

E(R.) = Rf +
Rf

f

[E(Rm) - Rj\

(2.3)

®

\ { R f - R m ) nX(Rf-R, )dF(R,, Rm)
Rf

| (/?/ —Rm) ndF(Rm)
-ac

where E(Rm) is the expected return o f the market portfolio, E(R,) is the expected
return o f asset /, and // = 1 or 2. When n = 1, equation (2.3) is the MLPM(1) model;
when n = 2, equation (2.3) is the MLPM(2) model. The following shows that the
GLPM and MLPM( 1) model are mathematically equivalent.

E(MRG,) / E(MRL,) = E(Gm) / E{Lm)
<=> (E(MRG.) / E(MRL,)) - 1= (E(Gm) / E{Lm)) - 1
<» E(MRGt) - E{MRL,)= ((£(Gm) / E(Lm)) - 1) E(MRL,) (2.4)
o

E(R,) - R/= «E (G m) / E(Lm)) - 1) E(MRL,)

o

E(R.) = Rf+ CEiM RL,) / E{Lm)) (E(Gm) - E(Lm))
E(R.) = Rf + {E{MRL,) / E(Lm)) (E(Rm) - Rf)

o

E(R,) = Rf +

(2.5)

(W m ) - /?/)
Q.E.D.

II
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Since the GLPM is mathematically equivalent to the MLPM(l), it can capture
the appeal o f the downside risk measure in the M LPM (l) model. However, as will
be shown, our empirical testing framework emphasizes the gain-loss tradeoff as
specified in the GLPM, instead o f following the traditional approach of the retumbeta relation as in the CAPM and M LPM (l) model.
2.3 The Sample
The monthly returns data are obtained from the 1997 Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) monthly files. The data comprises the set of all NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from January 1948 to December 1997. The CRSP
value weighted returns series is used to proxy for the market returns. We divide the
50-year sample period into 10 non-overlapping test periods, each consisting o f five
years.
The data set is adjusted for the delisting bias to mitigate survivorship bias.
Shumway (1997) finds that most o f the missing delisting returns in the CRSP tapes
are associated with negative events and suggests a -30% delisting monthly return for
NYSE and AMEX stocks. Similarly, Shumway and Warther (1998) suggest a
corrected delisting return of -55% for NASDAQ stocks. Following Shumway
(1997) and Shumway and Warther (1998), we classify delisting codes 500 and 505
through 588 as negative-performance-related and adjust the data set for the missing
delisting returns.
Since, in general, there is no return observations available after the delisting
month, some delisting stocks may not have enough observations to construct

12
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bootstrap samples. To be included in the analysis, a sample stock must have at least
24 consecutive monthly return observations in a given five-year test period.
2.4 The Testing Framework
In this section, the testing design and its strengths are discussed. The
construction o f confidence intervals based on the bootstrap percentiles is introduced.
Hypothesis testing with these empirical confidence intervals is then outlined.
2.4.1 The Testing Design
The theory in equation (2.2) indicates that the pricing error for asset /,
defined as PE, = E(MRG,) E(Lm) - E(MRL,) E(Gm), should be zero if the pricing of
the asset is consistent with the GLPM. Hence, we can test the GLPM by testing the
null hypothesis Ho. PE, = 0. However, PE, is a function o f the unknown
distributions o f MRG„ Lm, MRL„ and G„. Correspondingly, we propose a sample
pricing error, P E,, as:
PE, = E (MRG,) E (Lm) - E (MRL,) E (Gm)

(2.6)

where E (MRG,), E (MRL,), E (Gm), and E (Lm) are the sample mean estimates o f
E(MRG,), E(MRI.,), E(Gm), E(L„). Given that, for a given asset /, each return
observation is a random draw from a stable distribution that characterizes the asset,
the sample mean estimates are the unbiased estimates o f the true variables. That is,

E (MRG,) = E(MRG,) + £
E (MRL) = E(MRL,) + S,
E(G„) = E(Gm) +
E ( L m) = E (L m) + Cr,

13
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and the estimation errors, £„ S„ e„, and

are distributed with zero means. As a

result, the sample pricing error PE, is an unbiased estimate o f the pricing error PE,.
The testing framework based on PE, and PE, has two empirical strengths.
First, the tests based on the GLPM impose a stringent standard. In this study, the
null hypothesis is Ho. PE, = 0. Similar to the intercept term test o f Black, Jensen,
and Scholes (1972), this test focuses on whether there is a systematic component of
asset returns left unexplained by the model.7 Consequently, it imposes a higher
testing standard than the two-stage cross-sectional regressions o f Fama and MacBeth
(1973), in which the null hypothesis is whether the systematic risk measure is related
to asset return.
Second, testing H0: PE, = 0 can be conducted for each sample security. This
advantage allows us to answer the question: what proportion o f individual assets are
priced according to the GLPM? This is an important question because if only a small
number o f assets are mispriced, the feasibility o f exploiting mispricing opportunities
will be considerably limited.
Asset pricing tests based on individual assets also avoid the problematic
procedure of sorting securities into groups. For example, Litzenberger and
Ramaswamy (1979) argue that sorting procedures reduce the information content of
financial data. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) demonstrate that asset pricing tests are
subject to data-snooping bias when sorting procedures are based on empirical-based

To see the structural similarity between the two tests, rearrange the regression specification of
Black. Jensen, and Scholes (1972) to get: a + e(t) = R(t) - R /i) - b [/?„(0 - J?/0|. Since c(r) is
assumed to be mean zero in a LS regression, the intercept term test essentially tests whether the
pricing errors under the CAPM systematically differs from zero. Note that die RHS o f the above
equation and the RHS of equation (2.6) arc both the sample counterparts to the theoretical models.
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variables. Berk (2000) points out that if sorting variables are identified within the
sample, part o f the variations within or between groups might be spurious.
Consequently, he argues the true asset pricing model can be shown to have no
explanatory power when sorting procedures are employed.
2.4.2 The Percentile Intervals
This study uses the nonparametric bootstrap method. Suppose we are given
a random sample X, = (x,i, xl2, ..., x,T)' for asset /, where x„, / = 1, 2, ..., T, is an 1 x 4
vector of observations (MRG„, MRL„, G „, Lmt) from an unknown probability
distribution F* The purpose o f the bootstrap method is to estimate the sampling
distribution o f the parameter o f interest PE, = E(MRG,) E(L„)

-

E(MRL,) E(Gm), on

the basis o f the given sample.
Following Efron (1979), let F be the empirical probability distribution that
puts probability \/T, on each value x„, t = 1,2, ..., T,. The bootstrap method is to
estimate the sampling distribution o f PE, by the bootstrap distribution of PE, * =
E (M R G ,*)E (Lm*) - E (M R L ,*)E (G m*). Each*,* = (x„*, x,2* , ..., x,r *)' is a
random sample o f size T, drawn with replacement from the population o f T, objects
foi, *,2 ,

, x,r,)\ with F held fixed at its observed value.9 The calculation of PE, *

follows exactly the same functional form as PE, . ,0 To obtain the empirical bootstrap

* The symbol' denotes the transpose.
In light of time dependence in the return data, we also use block resampling. Using Hall.
Horowitz., and Jing's (1995) optimal asymptotic formula for block length, wc use a block size of two
for the bootstrap tests. The results arc similar to the baseline results that we report.
A
0 For example, suppose that T, - 60. E (A/KG,*) then may be obtained by computing (A/RG,3 +
A/KG, is + A/KG,j + A/KG,5tt + ...+ A/KG,24)/60.
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distribution o f PE, *, Monte Carlo realizations o f X * are generated 1,000 times to
obtain 1,000 PE, * s in this study."
2.4.3 Hypothesis Testing
Let H be the empirical bootstrap distribution o f PE, *. The 1 - 2r
percentile two-tailed confidence interval is defined by the r and 1 - r percentiles of
H . For example, at the 5% level o f significance, r is 2.5% and the lower and upper
bounds o f the 95% confidence intervals are the 25* and the 975lh observations o f the
ranked PE, * in our bootstrap setting. Similarly, at the 1% level o f significance, the
lower and upper bounds o f the 99% confidence intervals are the 5°* and the 995th
observations o f the ranked PE, * . Once the confidence intervals are obtained,
statistical inferences can be made in the usual way. If the 1 - 2r percentile
confidence interval covers the hypothesized value o f zero, the null hypothesis H0: PE,
= 0 is accepted; if the interval does not cover zero, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Similarly, critical values can be obtained by identifying the 2r or 1 - 2r percentiles of
H for one-tailed tests.
We use the percentile intervals based on the nonparametric bootstrap
because, as the results o f the normality test on the bootstrap distribution o f PE, * in
the next section indicate, the sampling distribution o f PE, is not normal .12 The
nonparametric bootstrap is free from distributional assumptions; it only requires a
random sample and a proposed statistic o f PE,. This property is particularly
'' According to Efron and Tibshirani (1993). the number of bootstrap replications typically ranges
from 50 to 200.
' ‘ PE, is the difference of two random products. Even we are willing to assume the four random
variatcs arc normally distributed, the resulting random products and their difference will not be
normally distributed. Therefore, it docs not appear to be feasible to derive an analytical test statistic
for PE,.
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appealing for this study since the distribution F is unknown and may not belong to a
class o f analytically tractable distributions. The strength of the bootstrap method is
that, even if the distribution F is unknown, this method leads to a consistent
estimator of PE, (Efron, 1979).
2.5 Empirical Results
This section further illustrates the testing framework based on the null
hypothesis, H0. PE, = 0. The bootstrap results are then reported. As a comparison,
the same bootstrap testing procedures are also applied to examine the CAPM. We
then extend the comparison to the case where artificial returns are added to return
observations. Finally, the distribution of the rejection of the null hypothesis across
sizes is examined to further demonstrate the empirical power o f the GLPM.
2.5.1 Estimating the Sampling Distributions of the Parameter PE,
The mean values of E(MRG,), E (M R L,), E (G m), and E{Lm) in each fiveyear test period are reported in table 2.1. During the 1948-1997 sample period, the
average monthly expected market related gain, E (MRG,), has a mean value of
2.24%, the average monthly expected market related loss, E(MRL,)y has a mean
value of 1.24%. In the same period, the time-series mean value of the average
monthly expected gain on the market index, E (Gm), is 1.96%, and the time-series
mean value o f the average monthly expected loss on the market index, E (Lm), is
1.19%, suggesting that the estimate o f the gain-loss ratio of market index, n , is 1.65
(1.96%/1.19%) during the 1948-1997 sample period.
For each sample stock in each of the 10 five-year test periods from 1948 to
1997, Fisher’s (1930) cumulant test for normality is applied to the bootstrap
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Table 2.1
Average Estimates of E {M R G t), E {M RLt), E (Gm), and E (L m), 1948-1997
This tabic presents the sample estimates of E(Gm). and E(Lm) and the mean values of the sample
estimates of E(\fRG,) and E(A/RL,) in the ten non-overlapping five-year test periods during the
1948-1997 sample period. AfRG,. AfRL,. Gm. and Lm is a random vector o f the market-related gain
o f asset /. a random vector of the market-related loss of asset /. a random vector of the gain on the
market index, and a random vector of the loss on the market index, respectively, in a test period.
Each clement of AIRG, is defined as AIRG„ = (R„ - Rfi) if /?„ > Rfi and AfRG,, = 0 otherwise: each
clement of AfRL, is defined as A IRL„ = - (R„ - Rfl) if Rm < RJt. and MRL„ = 0 otherwise: each
clement of G„ is defined as Gmt = (/?*, - Rfi) if Rm, > Rfi, Gml = 0 otherwise: and each element of Lm
is defined as LM = - (Rmt - Rfi) if Rm, < Rfi, Lmt = 0 otherwise. The data comprises the set of all
NYSE. AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks with a minimum of two years' continuous return
observations. The CRSP value weighted returns series represents the market returns. Following
Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warthcr (1998). the data set is adjusted for the delisting bias.

Test Period

# of Sample
Stocks

1948-1952

939

1953-1957

IOIO

1958-1962

1015

1963-1967

1728

1968-1972

1981

1973-1977

4155

1978-1982

4119

1983-1987

4496

1988-1992

4911

1993-1997

4414

Mean

Average

Average

E (AIRG,)
0.0237
(0.0083)
0.0165
(0.0074)
0.0223
(0.0090)
0.0295
(0.0174)
0.0212
(0.0138)
0.0230
(0.0175)
0.0304
(0.0154)
0.0199
(0.0187)
0.0184
(0.0205)
0.0186
(0.0170)
0.0224
(0.0145)

E(AIRL,)
0.0117
(0.0054)
0.0093
(0.0056)
0.0119
(0.0058)
0.0077
(0.0094)
0.0215
(0.0100)
0.0106
(0.0174)
0.0161
(0.0111)
0.0212
(0.0173)
0.0084
(0.0150)
0.0059
(0.0092)
0.0124
(0.0106)

E (G m)

E {Lm)

0.0227
(0.0030)
0.0193
(0.0030)
0.0204
(0.0028)
0.0155
(0.0023)
0.0184
(0.0031)
0.0176
(0.0044)
0.0226
(0.0038)
0.0219
(0.0037)
0.0190
(0.0031)
0.0189
(0.0024)
0.0196
(0.0032)

0.0100
(0.0024)
0.0102
(0.0022)
0.0110
(0.0029)
0.0077
(0.0021)
0.0164
(0.0033)
0.0216
(0.0038)
0.0178
(0.0038)
0.0153
(0.0045)
0.0112
(0.0026)
0.0076
(0.0019)
0.0119
(0.0030)
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distribution of the 1,000 PE, * s.13 Table 2.2 reports the results of this test. It is
clear that the bootstrap distribution of PE, * is far from normal for a large
percentage of sample stocks. During the SO year sample period, 52.61% and 36.69%
o f sample stocks exhibit significant skewness and kurtosis, respectively, in the
bootstrap distribution o f PE, *. The combined test o f skewness and kurtosis also
presents similar results, an average rejection rate o f 57.13%. These average rejection
rates are all far away from the 5% level o f significance.
Simulations are used to numerically show that the bootstrap distribution o f
the 1,000 PE, * s will be normal if the sampling distribution o f PE, is normal in our
bootstrap setting. First, a 60 x 1 o f unit normal random vector of PE, is drawn for
each artificial stock.14 This procedure is repeated to generate 10 sets o f artificial
stocks. The numbers o f artificial stocks in the 10 sets o f data correspond to the
number o f sample stocks in the 10 test periods from 1948 to 1997. Monte Carlo
realizations of bootstrap samples are then independently generated to obtain 1,000
PE, * s for each artificial stock. Applying Fisher’s cumulant test for normality to the
10 sets o f simulations shows that the bootstrap distribution o f PE, * are quite close
to normal. In table 2.3, the rejection rates for the skewness test, kurtosis test, and
the combined test are 7.78%, 4.57%, and 6.40%, respectively. These rejection rates
are all quite close to the 5% level o f significance o f the test. Based on these results,
13 The test statistic for skewness is ul=(k3/(k2)32) x (n /6)1C. The test statistic for kurtosis is u l=
(k4/(k2)2) x (n/24)|/2. The test statistics for the combined test is x2=ul2 + u2: . kl=m l/n.
k2=(nxm 2- m l2)/(n(n-l). k3=((n"xm3)-(3xnxm2xml)+(2xml3))/(nx(n-l)x(n-2)). k4=((n3n:)xm 4-4x(n:+n) xm 3xm l-3x(n2- n)xm22+12xm2xml2- 6 x m l4)/(nx(n-l)x(n-2)x(n-3)). m l.
m2, m3, and m4 arc the sample 1". 2nd. 3rd. and 4th moments, respectively. The critical value for
the skewness and kurtosis statistics arc 1.96. The critical value for the combined test is S.99.
I4Thc results arc invariant to the scaling o f normal random vectors.
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Table 2.2
Tests of Normality on the Bootstrap Distributions o f PE, * for Each Sample
Stock, 1948-1997
This tabic presents testing results of the Fisher's cumulant test for normality on the bootstrap
distribution of sample pricing errors for each sample stock. The data comprises the set of all
NYSE. AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks with a minimum of two years' continuous return
observations. Following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Waither (1998). the data set is
adjusted for the delisting bias. Monte Carlo realizations o f bootstrap samples are independently
generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap pricing errors for each sample stock. Fisher's cumulative test is
then applied to the bootstrap pricing errors for each sample stock. The critical value for skewness
statistic and kurtosis statistic is 1.96 at the 5% level of significance. The critical value for the
combined test is 5.99 at the 5% level of significance.
Skewness
Test
Period
1948-1952

# of
Sample
Stocks
939

1953-1957

1010

1958-1962

1015

1963-1967

1728

1968-1972

1981

1973-1977

4155

1978-1982

4119

1983-1987

4496

1988-1992

4911

199.3-1997

4414

Mean

# (and %)
of Stocks
Rejected
380
(40.47%)
378
(37.43%)
503
(49.56%)
1049
(60.71%)
889
(44.88%)
2989
(71.94%)
1853
(44.99%)
2744
(61.03%)
2583
(52.60%)
2763
(62.60%)
(52.61%)

Combined Test

Kurtosis

Test
Statistic

# (and %)
of Stocks
Rejected
202
(21.51%)
178
(17.62%)
304
(29.95%)
800
(46.30%)
548
(27.66%)
2314
(55.69%)
1297
(31.49%)
2497
(55.54%)
1837
(37.41%)
1929
(43.70%)
(36.69%)

0.72
0.85
1.59
2.42
1.14
3.28
1.30
0.55
1.39
1.28
1.45

Test
Statistic
0.96
0.82
1.47
2.48
1.39
3.05
1.49
2.99
1.93
2.21
1.88

# (and %)
of Stocks
Rejected
403
(42.92%)
386
(38.22%)
545
(53.69%)
1155
(66.84%)
934
(47.15%)
3242
(78.03%)
2014
(48.90%)
3187
(70.89%)
2785
(56.71%)
3001
(67.99%)
(57.13%)
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Test
Statistic
9.79
9.18
16.22
38.43
19.16
54.84
19.55
50.99
29.01
42.62
28.98

Table 2.3
Tests of Normality on the Bootstrap Distributions of Artificial PE, * from Unit
Normal Random Samples
This tabic presents testing results of the Fisher's cumulant test for normality on artificial pricing
errors. A 60 x 1 of unit normal random vector o f PE, is first drawn for each artificial stock. This
procedure is repeated to generate 10 sets of artificial stocks. The numbers of artificial stocks in the
10 sets arc 939. 1010. 1015. 1728. 1981. 4155. 4119, 4496. 4911. and 4414. Monte Carlo
realizations of bootstrap samples are independently generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap pricing
errors for each artificial stock. Fisher's cumulative test is then applied to the bootstrap pricing
errors for each artificial stock. The critical value for skewness statistic and kurtosis statistic is 1.96
at the 5% level of significance. The critical value for the combined test is 5.99 at the 5% level of
significance.
Skewness
Artificial
Simulation
# 1

#of
Artificial
Stocks
939

#2

1010

#3

1015

#4

1728

#5

1981

#6

4155

#7

4119

#8

4496

#9

4911

# 10

4414

Mean

# (and %)
of Stocks
Rejected
65
(6.92%)
96
(9.50%)
87
(8.57%)
105
(6.08%)
170
(8.58%)
332
(7.99%)
329
(7.99%)
319
(7.10%)
368
(7.49%)
335
(7.59%)
(7.78%)

Test
Statistic
0.04
0.01
0.04
-0.06
0.01
0.02
0.02
-0.02
-0.02
0.02
0.01

Combined Test

Kurtosis
# (and %)
o f Stocks
Rejected
34
(3.62%)
44
(4.36%)
41
(4.03%)
89
(5.15%)
90
(4.54%)
205
(4.93%)
205
(4.98%)
204
(4.54%)
246
(5.01%)
198
(4.49%)
(4.57%)

Test
Statistic
-0.13
-0.04
-0.09
-0.08
-0.06
-0.06
-0.06
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.07

# (and %)
o f Stocks
Rejected
53
(5.64%)
75
(7.43%)
55
(5.42%)
96
(5.56%)
139
(7.02%)
286
(6.88%)
286
(6.94%)
269
(5.98%)
334
(6.80%)
277
(6.28%)
(6.40%)
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Test
Statistic
2.09
2.33
2.21
2.12
2.29
2.25
2.26
2.20
2.24
2.21
2.22

it appears that the bootstrap method can approximate the distribution o f the PE, and
that the sampling distributions o f PE, for majority o f the sample stocks are not
normally distributed.
2.5.2 Test Results of the Null Hypothesis H«:

PEj

=0

The bootstrap method is used to construct the empirical distribution o f PE, *,
H . The 95% and 99% confidence intervals are defined by the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles and 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, respectively, o f H . If the confidence
interval covers the hypothesized value o f zero, then the null hypothesis Ha. PE, = 0 is
accepted; if the interval does not cover zero, then the null hypothesis is rejected.
Before using this testing framework on sample stocks, the bootstrap method
is numerically verified by applying it to the 10 sets o f artificial stocks created earlier.
These artificial data sets are actually generated in an ideal pricing environment in
which pricing error is drawn from a unit normal distribution with mean zero.
Consequently, if the bootstrap method is well-specified, the empirical rejection rates
o f these artificial data sets should be close to the levels o f significance. Table 2.4
reports the test results. The rejection rates for the 10 sets o f artificial stocks range
from 1.31% to 1.98% for the 1% level o f significance with a mean rejection rate o f
1.60%. At the 5% level o f significance, the rejection rates range from 5 .30% to
6.90% with an average o f 6.08%. As expected, these rejection rates are close to the
1% and 5% levels o f significance.
Note that the cross-sectional rejection frequency will be close to, but not
necessarily equal to, the level o f significance when the number o f sample stocks is a

22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 2.4
Testing Results o f the Null Hypotheses //#: Pis, = 0 with Bootstrap Confidence
Intervals on Each Artificial Stock
This tabic presents testing results o f the null hypothesis / / 0: PE, = 0 with bootstrap confidence
interv als on each artificial stock. A 60 x I of unit normal random vector of PE, is first drawn for
each artificial stock. This procedure is repeated to generate 10 sets o f artificial stocks. The numbers
of artificial stocks in the 10 sets are 939. 1010. 1015. 1728. 1981. 4155. 4119. 4496. 4911. and
4414. Monte Carlo realizations o f bootstrap samples are independently generated to obtain 1.000
bootstrap pricing errors for each artificial stock. The empirical distribution of these bootstrap
pricing errors is then used to construct the bootstrap confidence intervals. The 95% and 99%
percentile confidence intervals used in this study arc defined by the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles and the
0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, respectively, of the distribution o f the bootstrap pricing errors. If the
confidence interv al covers the hypothesized value o f zero, then the null hypothesis will be accepted:
if the interv al docs not cover zero, then the null hypothesis will be rejected. The 95% confidence
interval for the rejection rate in the last column is defined as a ± 2 x ( ( a x (l-a))/;V)lc . where N is
the number of artificial stocks and a is the level of significance used in the bootstrap tests.
Artificial

# o f Artificial

Simulation

Stocks

Bootstrap Distribution (%)
0.5

99.5

Total

95% Confidence
Interval

Panel A: 1% Level of Significance
# 1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
U7
#8
#9
# 10
Mean

939
1010
1015
1728
1981
4155
4119
4496
4911
4414

Panel B: 5% Lev el of Significance
# 1
939
#2
1010
H3
1015
#4
1728
#5
1981
#6
4155
#7
4119
it 8
4496
H9
4911
if 10
4414
Mean

Rejection Rate (%)
1.06
1.59
0.53
1.98
1.39
0.59
1.97
1.08
0.89
1.50
1.04
0.46
0.76
1.42
0.66
1.63
1.08
0.55
1.80
0.97
0.83
0.73
1.31
0.58
0.73
1.52
0.79
1.33
0.70
0.63
1.60
0.95
0.65
Bootstrap Distribution (%)
2.5

97.5

Total

2.34
3.27
3.25
3.41
2.52
3.06
3.11
2.82
3.42
2.54
2.97

3.30
2.97
3.65
2.43
3.08
3.56
3.35
2.96
3.03
2.76
3.11

5.60
6.24
6.90
5.84
5.60
6.62
6.46
5.78
6.45
5.30
6.08
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0 .3 5 -1 .6 5
0 .3 7 -1 .6 3
0 .3 8 - 1.62
0 .5 2 - 1 .4 8
0 .5 5 -1 .4 5
0 .6 9 - 1.31
0 .6 9 - 1.31
0 .7 0 - 1.30
0 .7 2 - 1 .2 8
0 .7 0 - 1.30

3 .5 8 -6 .4 2
3 .6 3 -6 .3 7
3.63 - 6 .3 7
3 .9 5 -6 .0 5
4.02 - 5.98
4.32 - 5.68
4.32 - 5.68
4 .3 5 -5 .6 5
4.38 - 5.62
4.34 - 5.66

fairly large finite number. According to Brown and Warner (1980), suppose that the
testing outcomes for each of the N assets in a test period are independent. Then at
the a level o f significance, the cross-sectional rejection frequency o f the N assets for
such a Bernoulli process has a mean o f a and a standard deviation of:

(2.7)

GjBemoulh, (a. I-a)

If asset pricing exactly follows the GLPM model, we should expect that there is an
approximately 95% probability that the cross-sectional rejection frequency o f the N
assets will fall into the 95% confidence interval o f a ± 2 x ogeraott//,. <a. i_a).
The 95% confidence intervals o f the random rejection rates for the 10
artificial data sets are given in the last column o f table 2.4. For the bootstrap tests
with the 1% level o f significance, eight out o f the 10 rejection rates are slightly above
the 95% confidence intervals of the random rejection rates. For the bootstrap tests
with the 5% level o f significance, five out o f the 10 rejection rates are slightly above
the 95% confidence intervals of the random rejection rates. The bootstrap rejection
rates and the normality rejection rates for the artificial data sets are above the levels
of significance because o f the randomness in the original sample. The reason is that,
although the original sample is drawn from a normal distribution, the original sample
and its mean value can be very far away from normal and zero, respectively.
Subsequently, the bootstrap samples and the bootstrap distribution that are based on
the original sample is also subject to this randomness. On the other hand, as the
probability that the original sample and its mean value are normally distributed and
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zero, respectively, goes to one in the limit, the normality rejection rate and the
bootstrap rejection rate will approach the levels of significance.
With the verification o f the bootstrap method under the null hypothesis, this
testing framework is applied to each sample stock in each o f the 10 five-year test
periods from 1948 to 1997. The testing results are reported in table 2.5. For the 10
test periods, rejection rates with the 1% level o f significance range from 1.28% to
3.07% with an average o f 2.03%. The mean rejection rate is 1.03% away from the
1% level of significance. With the 5% level o f significance, rejection rates range
from 6.01% to 8.18%. The mean rejection rate, 7.04%, is 2.04% above the 5% level
of significance. Overall, given the allowable level of the theoretical type-1 errors and
the randomness in the level o f the type-I errors, no more than 3% o f sample stocks
are mispriced. This evidence indicates that the pricing o f most stocks is consistent
with the GLPM.
We test the equality between the two-tailed rejection rates in table 2.4 and
2 .5. Under the null hypothesis that the pricing of stocks is consistent with the
GLPM, the bootstrap rejection rates based on sample stocks should not be
statistically different from those based on artificial stocks. That is, by the Z-test for
the equality between two proportions (binomial distribution), based on two bootstrap
rejection rates, kumpic and

Ksample —fCarttficial
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(2 8 )

Table 2.S
Testing Results o f the Null Hypotheses #/#: PEi = 0 with Bootstrap Confidence
Intervals on Each Sample Stock, 1948-1997
This tabic presents testing results of the null hypothesis Ho'. PE, = 0 with bootstrap confidence
intervals on each sample stock. The data comprises the set o f all NYSE. AMEX, and NASDAQ
stocks with a minimum o f two years' continuous return observations. Following Shumway (1997)
and Shumway and Warthcr (1998). the data set is adjusted for the delisting bias. Monte Carlo
realizations of bootstrap samples are independently generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap pricing
errors for each sample stock. The empirical distribution o f these bootstrap pricing errors is then
used to construct the bootstrap confidence intervals. The 95% and 99% percentile confidence
intervals used in this stud)' arc defined by the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles arid the 0.5 and 99.5
percentiles, respectively, o f the distribution of the bootstrap pricing errors. If the confidence
interval covers the hypothesized value of zero, then the null hypothesis will be accepted: if the
interval does not cover zero, then the null hypothesis w ill be rejected. The Z-statistics reported arc
based on the null hypothesis that the rejection rates between artificial and sample stocks should be
equal.
Bootstrap Distribution (%)
Test Period

# o f Sample Stocks

0.5

99.5

Total

Z-Statistic

Panel A: 1% Level of Significance
1948-1952
1953-1957
1958-1962
1963-1967
1968-1972
1973-1977
1978-1982
1983-1987
1988-1992
1993-1997
Mean

939
1010
1015
1728
1981
4155
4119
4496
4911
4414

Panel A: 5% Level o f Significance
1948-1952
939
1953-1957
1010
1958-1962
1015
1963-1967
1728
1981
1968-1972
1973-1977
4155
1978-1982
4119
1983-1987
4496
4911
1988-1992
1993-1997
4414
Mean
^Significant at the 5% level of significance

Rejection Rate (%)
1.38
1.70
0.32
2.08
3.07
0.99
0.69
1.28
0.59
0.17
1.39
1.56
0.91
1.97
1.06
0.19
2.14
1.95
0.41
1.53
1.94
1.45
2.47
1.02
1.22
1.26
2.48
0.54
1.22
1.76
0.90
1.13
2.03
Bootstrap Distribution (%)
2.5

97.5

Total

1.92
3.27
3.74
5.96
3.13
7.58
6.05
3.80
3.81
4.51
4.38

4.47
4.46
2.27
1.22
3.33
0.48
1.26
4.38
2.95
1.74
2.66

6.39
7.73
6.01
7.18
6.46
8.06
7.31
8.18
6.76
6.25
7.04
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0.19
1.56
-1.21
0.14
1.34
1.71
0.47
4.04*
3.40*
1.64

0.72
1.31
-0.81
1.60
1.14
2.52*
1.52
4.47*
0.62
1.91

where
p

KsampU +

K arpfiaaJ

2
we should expect that the Z statistic is within ±1.96 with a 95% probability. The Z
statistic is approximately normally distributed when the sample size, n, is larger than
30 (Kanji, 1993).
We find that, for bootstrap tests at the 1% and 5% levels o f significance, the
rejection rates o f sample stocks based on the GLPM are statistically different from
the rejection rates o f artificial stocks in only two test periods. In most test periods,
there is no significant difference between the GLPM rejection rates and the rejection
rates in the ideal pricing environment. It appears that the GLPM performs quite well.
2.5.3 The Bootstrap Results Based on the CAPM
As a comparison, the above bootstrap testing procedures are applied to
sample stocks to examine the CAPM. Based on the CAPM,

£(/?) _ R f= eovC/M M [ m j _ RA

(2 9)

we propose the CAPM sample pricing error, P E CAPM,, to be:
P£(\\ pM' = E (r)a m - _ E (rm)cov(R„ Rm)

(2.10)

where r, is the difference vector between individual returns and the risk free rates and
rm is the difference vector between market returns and the risk free rates. Using this
statistic, Monte Carlo realizations of resampled returns are generated 1,000 times to
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obtain the empirical bootstrap distribution of P E CAPM, *s. If the bootstrap percentile
confidence interval covers the hypothesized value o f zero, the null hypothesis H0:
PI? APM, = 0 is accepted; if the interval does not cover zero, the null hypothesis is
rejected.
The bootstrap testing results based on the CAPM are reported in table 2.6.
For the 10 test periods, rejection rates at the 1% level o f significance range from
1.28% to 3.37% with an average of 2.51%. The mean rejection rate is 1.51% away
from the 1% level o f significance. At the 5% level o f significance, rejection rates
range from 6.84% to 9.20%. The mean rejection rate, 8.03%, is 3.03% above the
5% level of significance. Compared with the bootstrap rejection rates based on the
GLPM, the CAPM rejection rates are 0.39% and 0.99% higher than the GLPM
rejection rates for the 1% and 5% levels o f significance, respectively. This indicates
that the GLPM performs better than the CAPM in explaining stock returns.
The test results o f the Z-test for the equality between the two-tailed rejection
rates in table 2.4 and 2.6 also confirms that the GLPM outperforms the CAPM.
Unlike the GLPM, which is rejected in two out o f the ten test periods, the rejection
rates of sample stocks based on the CAPM are statistically different from the
rejection rates of artificial stocks in six and eight out o f the ten test periods for
bootstrap tests at the 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively.
2.5.4 The Power o f the Bootstrap Tests
The moderate bootstrap rejection rates of the GLPM could be due to either
the explanatory ability o f the GLPM or the lack o f the power o f the bootstrap test.
To investigate the possibility that the bootstrap test will lead to rejection o f a false
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Table 2.6
Testing Results o f the Null Hypotheses H§: P E ^ ^ i = 0 with Bootstrap
Confidence Intervals on Each Sample Stock, 194*-1997
This tabic presents testing results of the null hypothesis H0: P ^ 2An,t = 0 with bootstrap confidence
intervals on each sample stock. The data comprises the set of all NYSE, AM EX and NASDAQ
stocks with a minimum of two years' continuous return observ ations. Following Shumway (1997)
and Shumway and Warthcr (1998). the data set is adjusted for the delisting bias. Monte Carlo
realizations o f bootstrap samples arc independently generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap pricing
errors based on the CAPM for each sample stock. The empirical distribution o f these bootstrap
pricing errors is then used to construct the bootstrap confidence intervals. The 95% and 99%
percentile confidence intervals used in this study are defined by the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles and the
0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, respectively, o f the distribution of the bootstrap pricing errors. If the
confidence interval covers the hypothesized value o f zero, then the null hypothesis will be accepted:
if the interval does not cover zero, then the null hypothesis will be rejected.
Bootstrap Distribution (%)
Test Period

# of Sample Stocks

0.5

99.5

Total

Z-Statistic

Panel A: 1% Level o f Significance
1948-1952
1953-1957
1958-1962
1963-1967
1968-1972
1973-1977
1978-1982
1983-1987
1988-1992
1993-1997
Mean

939
1010
1015
1728
1981
4155
4119
44%
4911
4414

Panel A: 5% Level o f Significance
1948-1952
939
1953-1957
1010
1958-1962
1015
1963-1967
1728
1968-1972
1981
1973-1977
4155
1978-1982
4119
1983-1987
4496
1988-1992
4911
1993-1997
4414
Mean
♦Significant at the 5% level of significance

Rejection Rate (%)
1.60
0.32
1.93
0.89
2.48
3.37
0.59
0.69
1.28
0.23
1.62
1.85
1.77
1.21
2.98
2.09
0.29
2.38
2.06
0.53
2.59
1.07
1.56
2.63
1.28
2.81
1.53
1.06
1.29
2.35
1.47
1.04
2.51
Bootstrap Distribution (%)
2.5

97.5

Total

2.45
3.76
4.33
7.29
3.23
7.82
6.99
3.98
4.44
4.33
5.20

5.11
5.25
2.66
1.91
4.24
0.72
1.38
4.69
3.26
2.51
2.83

7.56
9.01
6.99
9.20
7.47
3.54
8.37
8.67
7.70
6.84
8.03
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0.56
1.94
-1.23
0.80
3.35*
2.44*
2.45*
4.50*
4.39*
3.57*

1.71
2.35*
0.08
3.75*
2.38*
3.31*
3.31*
5.29*
2.42*
3.03*

null hypothesis, we add artificial monthly returns to the return observations and study
the bootstrap rejection rates under the alternatives. Figure 2.1 shows the bootstrap
rejection rates o f the GLPM and the CAPM when +1% to +5%, in increments o f 1%,
o f artificial monthly returns are added to sample stock returns. It is clear that the
bootstrap rejection rates increase under the two models as the level of artificial
returns increases. It also appears that the bootstrap rejection rates o f the two models
are quite similar under the alternatives. Similar results can also be found in figure 2.2
when -5% to -1% , in increments of 1%, o f artificial monthly returns are added to
sample stock returns.
2.5.5 The Distribution o f the Rejection Rates across Sizes
Focusing hypothesis testing on equation (2.2) and //o'- PE, = 0, we show that,
during the past 50 years from 1948 through 1997, no more than 3% of US stocks are
mispriced. It would be interesting to see whether the GLPM can do an equally good
job in explaining the pricing o f small and big size stocks.
The data set used for examining the distribution o f the rejection of the null
hypothesis across sizes is similar to the one described in section 2.3. It comprises the
set of all delisting-bias-adjusted NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from January
1948 to December 1997. Sample stocks in each five-year test period need to have at
least two years’ continuous returns. For each test period, based on NYSE size
breakpoints, all sample stocks are sorted into one o f the 10 portfolios, SI to S10,
arranged in order o f increasing market capitalization at the portfolio formation month
which is defined as the December immediately prior to the test period. In addition,
to be qualified as sample stocks, they need to have continuous returns for the four
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Figure 2.1 The bootstrap rejection rates based on the GLPM and the CAPM
with positive artificial returns added. The percentage o f sample stocks rejecting
the null hypothesis o f mispricing under the alternative hypothesis at various induced
levels o f positive artificial monthly returns (0% to +5% in increments o f 1%) based
on the GLPM and the CAPM. The bootstrap tests are one-tailed at the 5% level o f
significance.
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Figure 2.2 The bootstrap rejection rates based on the GLPM and the CAPM
with negative artificial returns added. The percentage o f sample stocks rejecting
the null hypothesis of mispricing under the alternative hypothesis at various induced
levels o f negative artificial monthly returns (0% to -5% in increments o f 1%) based
on the GLPM and the CAPM. The bootstrap tests are one-tailed at the 5% level of
significance.
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years prior to the portfolio formation date to mitigate the complication from the IPO
underperformance documented by Ritter (1991) and the others.13
Table 2.7 reports the distribution o f the bootstrap rejection rates o f the null
hypothesis H0: PE, = 0 for the 10 size portfolios. During the 1948-1997 sample
period, the density function o f the bootstrap rejection rates across sizes is decreasing
in size, but not monotonically. At the 1% level o f significance, the rejection rates for
SI to S10 portfolios during the 1948-1997 sample period are 2.74%, 2.37%, 2.67%,
1.65%, 1.88%, 1.94%, 1.72%, 1.14%, 0.88%, and 1.09%, respectively. At the 5%
level of significance, the rejection rates across sizes are 7.91%, 8.33%, 7.54%,
6.60%, 5.96%, 6.71%, 5.11%, 5.52%, 3.81%, and 4.64%, from the smallest size
decile to the largest one. Compared with the mean rejection rates o f 2.03% and
7.04% in table 2.5 for the 1% and 5% levels o f significance, respectively, the
rejection rates for S4 to S 10 portfolios appear to be moderate. On the other hand,
the rejection rates for SI to S3 portfolios are above the mean rejection rates o f
2.03% and 7.04% for the 1% and 5% levels o f significance, respectively. These
patterns are consistent with the documented size effect, in the sense that mispricing
occurs among small stocks. We also document that small stocks tend to generate
positive excess returns so that the rejection o f the null hypothesis tends to occur at
the downside o f the bootstrap distributions.
However, given the mean rejection rates o f 2.03% and 7.04% in table 2.5,
even the rejection rates o f 2.74% and 7.91% in SI portfolio do not appear too far

15 The conclusions are invariant to whether the sample stocks arc required to have continuous
returns Tor the four years prior to the portfolio formation month.
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Table 2.7
The Distribution of the Bootstrap Rejection Rates across Sizes
This tabic presents the rejection rates o f the null hypothesis H0: PE, = 0 with bootstrap confidence
interv als for the 10 size portfolio during the 1948-1997 sample period. The data comprises the set
of all NYSE. AM EX and NASDAQ stocks with a minimum of two years' continuous return
observations. Following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1998). the data set is
adjusted for the delisting bias. For each five-year test period, based on NYSE size breakpoints, all
sample stocks arc sorted into one of the 10 portfolios. SI to S10. arranged in order o f increasing
market capitalization at the portfolio formation month. In addition, to be qualified as sample
stocks, they need to have continuous returns for the four years prior to the portfolio formation date.
Monte Carlo realizations of bootstrap samples are independently generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap
pricing errors for each sample stock. The empirical distribution of these bootstrap pricing errors is
then used to construct the bootstrap confidence intervals. The 95% and 99% percentile confidence
intervals used in this study arc defined by the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles and the 0.5 and 99.5
percentiles, respectively, of the distribution of the bootstrap pricing errors.

Size Decile

#of

Two-Tailed Theoretical Significance Level
5%
1%

Sample
Stocks

Bootstrap Distribution (%)
2.5
Total

0.5

99.5

97.5

Total

Rejection Rate (%)
Smallest

Largest
Mean

1

5098

1.53

1.21

2.74

5.28

2.63

7.91

2

1813

1.43

0.94

2.37

5.63

2.70

8.33

3

1538

1.63

1.04

2.67

4.49

3.05

7.54

4

1396

1.07

0.58

1.65

4.16

2.44

6.60

5

1270

0.94

0.94

1.88

3.83

2.13

5.96

6

1178

0.50

1.44

1.94

3.06

3.65

6.71

7

1095

0.91

0.82

1.72

3.01

2.10

5.11

8

1052

0.29

0.85

1.14

2.95

2.57

5.52

9

1024

0.39

0.49

0.88

1.85

1.96

3.81

10

1014

0.30

0.79

1.09

2.17

2.47

4.64

0.90

0.91

1.81

3.65

2.57

6.22
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away from the 1% and 5% levels o f significance, respectively, under the null. In
addition, in comparison with the downside 0.5% and 2.5% levels o f significance, the
downside rejection rates of 1.53% and 5.28% in SI portfolios suggest that it will be
difficult to identify mispricing opportunities since, on average, at most three out of
100 stocks in the smallest size decile are mispriced. Overall, these results suggest
that the mispricing in small size portfolios is not severe.
2.5.6 Biases o f the LS Estimates
Instead of focusing hypothesis testing on equation (2.2) and H0: PE, = 0, one
may attempt to examine the GLPM by testing a linear functional form, such as
equation (2.4) or (2.5). To illustrate this linear testing framework, we assume that:

E (MRG,) = E(MRG,) + 4
E (M RL) = E(MRL) + 8,
where estimation errors

and 8, are assumed to be normally distributed with zero

means and uncorrelated with the true values, E(MRG,) and E(MRL). These error
assumptions are then substituted into the GLPM to obtain the following identity:

E (MRG,) = n E (MRL,) + 4 - x 8,
This equation then can be rewritten as a regression model:

E(MRG,) = a+ b E (MRL,) + e,
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(2.11)

where a = 0, b = n, e, =

- 7z 8,. In practice, the estimated coefficients a and b are

compared to zero and an estimate o f /r estimated from the same estimation period,
respectively. That is, this regression model can be estimated for each test period
based on the two-stage cross-sectional regression o f Fama and MacBeth (1973).
However, the regression model is subject to EIV (errors-in-variable) problems in
which the second stage regressors are estimated with errors.
To demonstrate the extent of EIV biases, the results o f the LS regression
analysis on equation (2.11) are reported in table 2.8. As expected, the estimates b in
the 10 five-year test periods are all biased downward when they are compared with
the sample estimates n = E (G„)/E(Lm) from the same estimation period. For
example, during the 1993-1997 test period, b is 0.2899 with a standard error o f
0.0297, which is biased downward by approximately 88.34%, as measured by the
percentage sample estimated bias, (b - j t ) / n .
To see whether the downward biases in b are due to EIV problems, the
percentage implied asymptotic bias is defined as:

2 > (< s> :
( A - * ) / ; j = --------------

r

(2.12)

which is based on the asymptotic LS estimator o f 7t (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, and Lee,
1980, p. 514).

plim b = x - 7t —

---------
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(2.13)

Table 2.8
Biased Results o f LS Regressions, 1948-1997
This tabic presents the results based on the following regression specification:
E (M RG,) = a + b E (MRL,) + e,
where E (MRG,) = E(MRG,) + £; and E(M RL,) = E(MRL,) + 6,. Let it = E (G m) / E (L m). The
percentage sample estimated bias is defined
bias is defined as:

as (b - it) I it . The percentage implied asymptotic

2 > (< sy
(b - it) / it = ----- -—--------N 0 ‘( E ( A lR ii) ) ’
The data comprises the set of all NYSE. AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks with a minimum of two
years' continuous return observations. Following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther
(1998). the data set is adjusted for the delisting bias.

Test Period
1948-1952
1953-1957
1958-1962
1963-1967
1968-1972
1973-1977
1978-1982
1983-1987
1988-1992
1993-1997
Mean

a
(Std. Err.)
0.0178
(0.0006)
0.0136
(0.0004)
0.0173
(0.0006)
0.0278
(0.0008)
0.0140
(0.0008)
0.0219
(0.0005)
0.0259
(0.0006)
0.0186
(0.0007)
0.0177
(0.0005)
0.0168
(0.0004)
0.0191
(0.0006)

b
(Std. Err.)
0.5127
(0.0418)
0.3193
(0.0343)
0.4150
(0.0392)
0.2154
(0.0547)
0.3335
(0.0293)
0.1091
(0.0159)
0.2832
(0.0297)
0.0641
(0.0212)
0.0772
(0.0194)
0.2899
(0.0297)
0.2619
(0.0315)

Percentage
Implied
Asymptotic
Bias
-62.51%

/?-(%)

2.2700

Percentage
Estimated
Bias
-77.41%

1.8922

-83.13%

-72.62%

7.90

1.8545

-77.62%

-64.99%

9.95

2.0130

-89.30%

-104.11%

0.89

1.1220

-70.28%

-66.50%

6.14

0.8148

-86.61%

-73.13%

1.12

1.2697

-77.70%

-91.04%

2.16

1.4314

-95.52%

-104.29%

0.20

1.6964

-95.45%

-96.99%

0.32

2.4868

-88.34%

-88.44%

2.12

1.6851

-84.14%

-82.46%

4.46

it
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13.81

If the biases in b are largely due to EIV problems and the sample estimates n are a
good proxy for the parameter Jt, the percentage implied asymptotic biases, ( b - n ) I
tv,

should be close to the percentage sample estimated biases, (b -

tc)

/ n . Using

the sample variances for o(S,)2 and aiE(M R L,))2, the percentage implied asymptotic
biases are reported in table 2.8. During the 1948-1997 sample period, the percentage
implied asymptotic biases are all quite close to and correlated with the percentage
sample estimated biases. These results indicate that EIV problems are severe when
tests are based on a two-stage cross-sectional regression.
2.6 Conclusions
This study tests the GLPM whose functional form is different from the
traditional beta-coefficient functional form. The GLPM incorporates loss aversion,
in which the risk-retum tradeoffs are based on expected market-related losses and
expected market-related gains. The testing framework used in this study also
imposes a higher testing standard and places no restrictions on the distribution o f the
statistic with the use of the bootstrap. The results show that the mean rejection rates
of the GLPM are 2.03% and 7.04% for the 1% and 5% levels o f significance,
respectively, during the 1948-1997 sample period. The highest rejection rates in the
10 five-year test periods are 3.07% and 8.18% for the 1% and 5% levels o f
significance, respectively. Given the allowable level o f the 1% and 5% levels of
significance and the randomness in the level of the type-I errors, no more than 3% of
sample stocks are mispriced. Moreover, the mispricing in small size portfolios is not
severe. These results indicate that the GLPM appears to do a good job of explaining
stock returns.
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Based on the CAPM, researchers have identified a number of anomalies in
asset prices. Empirical anomalies can arise from several sources, such as market
frictions, false inferences o f the risk-retum relationship, inappropriate risk measures,
and mispricing by market participants. The results o f the bootstrap tests in this study
suggest that there are not many mispriced stocks according to the GLPM. For future
research, it should be interesting to apply this testing framework, based on the
GLPM, to re-examine these anomalies.
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CHAPTER 3
LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WITH
A NORMATIVE ASSET PRICING MODEL

3.1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies document a number o f anomalies in long-term
common stock performance.16 While the empirical evidence appears quite strong,
long-term performance studies that use a d hoc models suffer from theoretical and
statistical difficulties, which limits their usefulness as tests of the efficient market
hypothesis. This study provides a new long-term testing framework that mitigates
these theoretical and statistical problems.
To study long-term performance, researchers need an asset pricing model to
generate “normal” (expected) returns so that “abnormal” returns can be measured.
Because o f the prominent results o f Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996), many
recent long-term performance studies use the Fama-French three factor model to
obtain expected returns. However, the Fama-French three factor model is a positive
(empirically based) model. The model empirically identifies the mimicking portfolios
of size and book-to-market ratio (BE/ME) as risk factors. According to Loughran
and Ritter (2000), “if a positive (empirically based) model is used, one is not testing
market efficiency; instead, one is merely testing whether any patterns that exist are
being captured by other known patterns.” They argue that tests o f market efficiency
require a normative (equilibrium) asset pricing model.

16 These anomalies include market overreaction (De Bondt and Thaler. 198S), the long-term
undcrpcrformancc o f initial public offerings (Ritter, 1991). market underreaction (Jcgadcesh and
Titman. 1993). and the long-term undcrpcrformancc o f seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and
Ritter (1995). Spiess and Aflleck-Graves (1995)).
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In addition, Fama (1998) and Fama and French (1996) demonstrate that long
term performance evaluation is sensitive to the assumed model for expected returns
and argue that many long-term anomalies are artifacts o f bad-model problems.
Specifically, Fama (1998) argues that a reasonable change of models often causes an
anomaly to disappear. Furthermore, as Fama (1998) indicates, even the Fama-French
three-factor model does not provide a full explanation o f returns in the size and
BE!ME dimensions that are supposed to be well captured by construction.
Therefore, it is o f interest to see how long-term anomalies behave under another
asset pricing model. To address these theoretical issues, in this study we use a new
normative (equilibrium) model to assess long-term performance.
This new normative model incorporates loss aversion into equilibrium asset
pricing. Empirical evidence on risk aversion indicates that the variance o f portfolio
returns does not fully characterize economic agents’ perception o f and behavior
toward risk. A number of studies o f risky choice involving monetary outcomes have
documented that economic agents are averse to losses. For example, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986, 1991, 1992) find that economic
agents are much more sensitive to losses than to gains. This loss-averse view is also
advocated by Fishbum (1977) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
The property o f loss aversion is specified by a gain-loss utility function in this
new normative (equilibrium) model. Under this utility function restriction, in which
investors are assumed to be more averse to losses when they expect to lose more, Lin
(1999a) derives the Gain-Loss Pricing Model (GLPM). The GLPM is more robust
than the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and
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Mossin (1966), and is valid for all financial assets at the Pareto-optimal allocation of
risk. Because o f its theoretical properties and normative nature, we use the GLPM
for the measurement o f pricing errors.
It is well known that the traditional event-time methods for long-term
performance evaluation are troubled by the skewness o f abnormal return
distributions. Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Fama (1998),
and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) show that commonly used return metrics to test
for long-term abnormal stock returns may lead to misspecified test statistics due to
the skewness o f abnormal return distributions. These inference problems are
particularly severe when monthly returns are compounded to obtain abnormal return
measures.
To resolve these statistical problems, this study uses the nonparametric
bootstrap method that incorporates the distributional information intrinsic within the
sample into estimation and inference. The nonparametric bootstrap is free from
distributional assumptions; it only requires a random sample and a proposed statistic.
Thus, the statistical difficulties due to skewness o f abnormal return distributions are
mitigated. Furthermore, the long-term performance evaluation framework used in
this study is based on a return metric obtained by resampling return observations and
by analyzing the whole return distribution without compounding performance
measures. Consequently, our test is free from the aggregation problems in many
long-term performance tests.
The specification of our long-term performance evaluation framework is
evaluated using samples of randomly selected NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks and
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simulated random event dates. Our simulation results show that the long-term
performance evaluation framework based on the GLPM is well-specified. When
artificial abnormal returns are added to real return observations, we find that our
evaluation framework exhibits adequate power to reject the null hypothesis o f no
long-term abnormal returns. We further illustrate the use o f this long-term
performance evaluation framework by examining the long-term returns o f initial
public offerings (IPOs). We find that, consistent with the documented
underperformance (Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and AffleckGraves (1995), and Loughran and Ritter (2000)), IPOs tend to be negatively
mispriced in their post-event windows according to the GLPM.
The remainder o f this essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the GLPM and characterizes the normative (equilibrium) nature o f the GLPM.
Section 3.3 explains the long-term evaluation framework, the bootstrap method, and
simulation methods. Section 3.4 provides simulation results. Section 3.5 illustrates
the use of this approach by examining the long-term returns of IPOs. Section 3.6
concludes this essay.
3.2 The Gain-Loss Pricing Model (GLPM)
The GLPM postulates that any asset / must be priced such that .

E(MRG') = E(Gm)
E(MRJ:,)
E(Lm)

where
MRG,

=

(R, - Rf) if Rm> Rf and MRG, = 0 otherwise;
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r

MRL, = -(/?, —Rj) if Rm < Rj, and MRL, = 0 otherwise;
Gm = (R m -

Rf)

if R m >

R f, Gj „

= 0 otherwise; and

Lm= - (Rm - Rj) if Rm < R f, Lm= 0 otherwise.
As a normative (equilibrium) model, the GLPM says that, in market equilibrium, the
ratio o f expected market-related gain to expected market-related loss o f asset /,
E(MRG,)/E(MRLj), is equal to the ratio o f expected gain to expected loss of the
market portfolio, E(Gm)/E(Lm). Since the gain-loss ratio of the market portfolio, n=
E(Gm)/E(Lm), is invariant to all assets, the GLPM predicts that the higher the
expected market-related loss o f an asset, the higher the expected market-related gain
investors require to compensate for the loss. Thus, under the GLPM, the gain-loss
ratio o f the market portfolio defines the gain-loss tradeoff for individual assets.
3.3 The Long-Term Performance Evaluation Framework
In this section, our long-term performance evaluation framework is
introduced. The selection o f critical values based on the bootstrap percentiles and
the hypothesis testing for each individual security are first outlined. Then a test
statistic for a sample of finitely many event securities is proposed. We close this
section with a description of the simulation method used to evaluate the specification
and the power o f the long-term testing framework.
3.3.1 The Test Statistic for Each Security
The long-term performance evaluation framework proposed in this study
comprises two steps. The first step is to test whether the long-term performance of
an event security and a matching pseudo security is significantly deviated from the
GLPM risk-retum tradeoff in the post-event window. This testing procedure is
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repeated for each event and pseudo security to obtain two rejection rates o f the
GLPM risk-retum tradeoff for the event and pseudo samples, one rejection rate for
each sample. The second step o f the long-term performance evaluation framework is
then to test the equality o f the two rejection rates between the event sample and the
pseudo sample.
According to the GLPM, the pricing error for security /, PE, = E(MRG,)
E(Lm) - E(MRL,) E(Gm), should be zero if the pricing o f the security is consistent
with the GLPM. Hence, if we are interested in knowing whether a particular event
security exhibits long-term positive or negative abnormal performance, we can
conduct a direct test by testing the null hypothesis H 0 : PE, < 0 or H o. PE, > 0,
respectively, for the event security. However, PE, is a function of the unknown
distributions of MRG„ Lm, MRL,, and Gm. For long-term performance evaluation, we
are also only interested in the pricing o f an event security in the post-event window.
Correspondingly, we define the pricing error statistic, PE, , as:
PE, = E (MRG,) E (Lm) - E (M R L ,)E (G m)

(3.2)

and the statistic PE, depends on the return observations in /’s post-event window. It
is also understood that post-event window is individual-specific; that is, different
event securities may have different post-event windows.
3.3.2 The Bootstrap Distribution and Hypothesis Testing on Each Security
A primary question in long-term event studies is whether one particular
event has a long-term economic impact on the value o f a firm. If the economic
impact soon dissipates or even does not exist, the empirical risk-retum tradeoff based
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on the post-event return distributions should be consistent with a well-specified asset
pricing model because at most only a few return observations deviate from the
benchmark. That is, given a size n o f event sample and the r level o f significance, we
should observe that there are approximate n x (1 - r) event stocks whose pricing in
post-event windows is consistent with the well-specified asset pricing model. In
contrast, if the economic impact persists and many return realizations systematically
deviate from the benchmark, we should observe that the empirical risk-retum
tradeoff based on the post-event return distributions will be inconsistent with the
well-specified asset pricing model. That is, the number of post-event mispricing will
be significantly higher than n x (1 - r).
In this study, we focus on sample pricing error PE, which is defined by the
post-event return distributions and use the nonparametric bootstrap method to
estimate the distributional properties o f P E ,. Based on Monte Carlo resampling of
return observations, this method simulates the bootstrap pricing errors, PE, *. To
test whether a security has long-term positive or negative abnormal returns in its
post-event window, our testing framework uses the empirical bootstrap distribution
of PE, * to find the critical values. Let H be the empirical bootstrap distribution of
PE, * . The r% critical value for testing whether a security has long-term positive
abnormal returns is defined by the r percentile o f H . For example, with a 1,000
times of Monte Carlo simulation, the 5% critical value is the SO**1observation o f the
ranked PE, *. Similarly, at the 1% level o f significance, the critical value is the 10th
observation o f the ranked PE, * . Once the critical values are obtained, statistical
inferences can be made in the usual way. If the r critical value is greater than the
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hypothesized value o f zero, the null hypothesis / / 0: PE, < 0 is accepted for event
security /'; if the critical value is less than zero, the alternative hypothesis Ho'. PE, > 0
is accepted for event security /'. Similarly, to test whether a security has long-term
negative abnormal returns, the r% critical value is defined by the 1 - r percentile of
H

Then, by repeating this testing procedure for each event sample security, we

obtain the rejection rate of the tests for long-term positive or negative abnormal
performance for the event sample.
W e use the empirical critical values based on the nonparametric bootstrap
because the nonparametric bootstrap is free from distributional assumptions; it only
requires a random sample and a proposed statistic of PE,. This property is
particularly appealing for this study since the distribution F is unknown and may not
belong to a class o f analytically tractable distributions. The strength o f the bootstrap
method is that, even if the distribution F is unknown, this method leads to a
consistent estimator of PE, (Efron, 1979). Furthermore, the traditional event-time
methods for long-term performance evaluation are hampered by the skewness of
abnormal return distributions. By incorporating the distributional information
intrinsic to the sample, the statistical inferences based on the bootstrap method used
in this study are likely to be more robust.
3.3.3 The Test Statistic for a Pair o f n Event Securities and n Pseudo Securities
After acquiring the rejection rates o f the null hypotheses H o - PE, < 0 and
H0: PE, > 0 for the event sample o f size //, we construct a pseudo sample o f size n
from non-event securities and to obtain the rejection rates o f the null hypotheses Ho .
PE, < 0 and

Ho .

PE,

>

0 for the pseudo sample. The construction o f the pseudo
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sample matches the sampling timing o f the event sample. That is, for each event
security, a pseudo security is randomly selected from non-event securities such that
the pseudo security has return observations covering the beginning of the event
security’s post-event window. We then include the available return observations o f
the pseudo security in the post-event window in the pseudo sample. The reason that
the event and pseudo samples are matched in the beginning o f the sampling period is
that the sampling o f the event securities is not independent. For example, the hot
market hypothesis of IPOs suggests that IPOs cluster in calendar time. It is widely
known that certain events typically cluster in calendar time and this clustering affects
statistical inferences (Brown and Warner (1980, 1985)). To the extent that calendartime clustering exists in the event sample, it is also present in the pseudo sample, and
thus is, to some degree, controlled for in our tests. Also, this matching procedure
avoids the survivorship bias in the sense that the survivorship o f event and pseudo
securities are independent o f each other. Therefore, with the same probability, event
securities may have a shorter or longer return series than the corresponding pseudo
securities.
When choosing a pseudo security for an event security, we exclude the other
event securities whose post-event windows are within the event security’s post-event
window from consideration. Based on Loughran and Ritter’s (2000) argument, the
least powerful test is to select a pseudo security only from the event securities.
Therefore, to enhance the power o f the test, we make sure that the pseudo sample is
not contaminated by the presence o f event securities.
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The second step o f the long-term performance evaluation framework is to
test the equality o f the two rejection rates between the event sample and the pseudo
sample. Under the null hypothesis that there is no long-term abnormal returns
associated with the event, the two rejection rates should be equal. In contrast, if
event securities tend to generate positive (negative) abnormal long-term returns, then
the event sample should have a higher rejection rate with the null hypothesis H0: PE,
< 0 (H0: PE, > 0) than the pseudo sample.
We use the Z-test for the equality between tw o proportions (binomial
distribution). This test is used to investigate the null hypothesis of equality between
two population mispricing proportions, based on two sample mispricing rates,
and KpKuia- The test statistic is:

/C event

—

{P(\-P)

K pseudo

L/f J

r

where
p

K evcn t

K pseudo

■+■

2
Under the null hypothesis Ho. PE, < 0,

and

are the rejection rates o f H0:

PE, < 0 based on the r percentile of H for event and pseudo sample, respectively.
Under the null hypothesis H0: PE, > 0, Kkoa and «q»cudo are the rejection rates o f Ho .
PE, > 0 based on the 1 —r percentile of H for event and pseudo sample,
respectively. Under both null hypotheses, Z is approximately distributed as a unit
normal distribution when the sample size is sufficient large, e.g., n > 30. Given that
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the sample sizes in most event studies are much higher than this number, the use o f
the Z-test should be appropriate in practice.
3.3.4 Simulation Method
To test the specification of our long-term performance evaluation framework,
500 random event samples o f 200 sample securities each are drawn. We randomly
select event securities with replacement from the population of all NYSE, AM EX
and NASDAQ ordinary common stocks in the 1997 Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) monthly files. Our analysis covers the period July 1973 through
December 1997. We chose this period because we would like to compare our results
with the power tests documented in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) whose sample
period starts in July 1973.
Once an event stock is selected, we adjust its return observations for the
delisting bias to mitigate survivorship bias. Shumway (1997) finds that most o f the
missing delisting returns in the CRSP tapes are associated with negative events and
suggests a -30% delisting monthly return for NYSE and AMEX stocks. Similarly,
Shumway and Warther (1998) suggest a corrected delisting return o f -55% for
NASDAQ stocks. Following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1998),
we classify delisting codes 500 and 505 through 588 as negative-performance-related
and adjust the data set for the missing delisting monthly returns with -30% for
NYSE and AMEX stocks and with -55% for NASDAQ stocks.
Each time an event stock is selected, we randomly generate a random event
month between July 1973 and December 1992, December 1994, or December 1996,
depending on whether performance is evaluated over a five-, three-, or one-year
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period following the event month. To mitigate the effect o f survivorship bias, if the
event stock does not have full observations, the bootstrap test is conducted for as
many months as the delisting-bias-adjusted data are available. If the event stock does
not have return observations for the event month, we randomly select another event
stock with another event month until the event stock has return observations for the
event month. By doing so, we are more likely to sample stocks with a longer period
of return observations. As Barber and Lyon (1997) argue, this is sensible since most
long-term event studies analyze events that are proportional to the history o f a firm.
For each event stock, a pseudo stock is randomly chosen with the delisting
bias adjusted from the non-event stocks in the 1997 CRSP population such that the
available return observations of the pseudo stock cover the beginning o f the post
event window o f the event stock. That is, for the pseudo stock, we do not generate
another event month; we include the available return observations o f the pseudo
security in its post-event window in the pseudo sample. Therefore, the probability
that the event stock may have a higher or lower number o f available return
observations than the pseudo stock is the same. By repeating this matching
procedure, we obtain 500 pseudo samples o f 200 pseudo stocks each. Once the
event and pseudo samples are constructed, we apply the bootstrap method to each
event and pseudo stock.
The next step o f the long-term testing framework is to use the Z-test in
equation (3 .3) with the a level of significance for each pair of the 500 event and
pseudo samples. If the test is well-specified, 500a tests should reject the null
hypothesis o f equality between two population mispricing proportions because o f the
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Type-I error. We test the specification o f the long-term testing framework at the 1%
and 5% levels of significance.
3.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulation results in 500 random pairs o f event
and pseudo samples. The specification and power of the long term performance
evaluation framework are the focus o f this study.
3.4.1 Specification
The baseline results are based on 500 random pairs o f event and pseudo
samples with 200 random events in each pair. To assess the specification o f the
long-term performance evaluation framework based on the GLPM, we first test
whether the GLPM describes the risk-retum tradeoff in the post-event window for
each event and pseudo stock. Table 3.1 reports the average rejection rates o f the
null hypothesis o f no long-term positive abnormal returns, i.e.,

Ho'.

PE, < 0, and that

o f no long-term negative abnormal returns, i.e., H 0: PE, > 0, for the 100,000 (500 x
200) event stocks and the corresponding 100,000 pseudo stocks at one-, three-, and
five-year horizons. At the 1% level o f significance, the empirical rejection rates
range from 1.28% to 2.46%. The empirical rejection rates range from 5.57% to
8 .77% for the 5% level o f significance. The test results show that the rejection rates
of the bootstrap test are not far from the theoretical level o f significance. The
rejection rates for H o. PE, < 0 and H o - PE, > 0 seem, in general, not far from
symmetry; the only exception is that when the 5% level o f significance is used at the
five-year horizon we observe a higher frequency of positive abnormal performance.
It also appears that our long-term performance evaluation framework is not
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Table 3.1
Rejection Rates of the Null Hypotheses o f No Long-Term Positive and Negative
Abnormal Returns with Bootstrap Critical Values on Each Event and Pseudo
Stock for the 500 Random Pairs of Event and Pseudo Samples of 200 Stocks
Each
This tabic presents the rejection rates o f the null hypotheses of no long-term positive abnormal
returns . i.e.. H0: PE, < 0. and o f no long-term negative abnormal returns, i.e.. H0: PE, > 0, with
bootstrap critical values on each random event stock and pseudo stock. We first randomly select
event stocks with replacement from the population of all NYSE, AM EX and NASDAQ ordinary
common stocks in the 1997 CRSP monthly files. Once an event stock is selected, following
Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1998). we adjust its return observations for the
delisting bias to mitigate survivorship bias. For each event stock, a random event month between
July 1973 and December 1992. December 1994. or December 1996 is generated, depending on
whether performance is evaluated over a five-, three-, or one-year period following the event month.
This procedure is repeated to obtain 500 random event samples of 200 event stocks each. Then, for
each event stock, a pseudo stock is randomly chosen with the delisting bias adjusted from the other
stocks in the 1997 CRSP population such that the available return observations o f the pseudo stock
cover the beginning of the post-event window of the event stock. This procedure is repeated to
obtain 500 random pseudo samples o f 200 pseudo stocks each. Monte Carlo realizations of
bootstrap samples arc then independently generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap pricing errors for each
event and pseudo stock. The empirical distribution of these bootstrap pricing errors is used to
construct the bootstrap critical values. The numbers presented are the rejection rates of the null
hypotheses of no long-term positive abnormal returns . i.e., H0: PE, < 0. and of no long-term
negative abnormal returns, i.e.. H0: PE, > 0. on each random event stock and pseudo stock for the
500 pairs of event and pseudo samples.
Tlieoretical Significance Level
1%

5%
The Null Hypothesis

//„: PE, < 0

H0: PE, > 0

H 0. PE, < 0

H0: PE, £ 0

Panel A. One-Year Horizon
Event Sample

1.30

2.08

5.57

6.78

Pseudo Sample

1.28

2.11

5.64

6.77

Panel B. Three-Year Horizon
Event Sample

2.26

2.17

8.08

6.33

Pseudo Sample

2.24

2.14

8.06

6.28

Event Sample

2.46

2.25

8.77

5.92

Pseudo Sample

2.41

2.23

8.71

5.93

Panel C. Five-Year Horizon
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particularly troubled by the skewness and aggregation problems since there is no
monotonic relationship between empirical bootstrap rejection rate and the length o f
time horizon.
Under the null hypothesis, the specification o f the long-term performance
evaluation framework based on the GLPM is assessed by the Z-tests of equalities
between the bootstrap rejection rates of H0: PE, < 0 and H0: PE, > 0 for the 500
random pairs o f event and pseudo samples. The test results are reported in table 3 .2.
At the 1% level of significance for the Z-tests, the rejection rates o f the equalities
between the bootstrap rejection rates of H0: PE, < 0 and H0: PE, > 0 range from
0.2% to 2.0%. At the 5% level o f significance for the Z-tests, the rejection rates o f
the equalities range from 4.2% to 7.2%.
If the rejection rates o f the equalities between the bootstrap rejection rates is
viewed as a random variable, the Z-test rejection rates will be close to, but not
necessarily equal to, the level o f significance for the Z-tests when the number o f the
pairs of event and pseudo samples is a fairly large finite number. According to
Brown and Warner (1980), suppose that the testing outcomes for each pair o f the N
pairs of event and pseudo samples are independent, then at the a level o f significance
for the Z-tests, the rejection rate o f the N Z-tests for such a Bernoulli process has a
mean of a and a standard deviation of:

^

B e r n o u lli.

(3.4)

(a. 1- a )
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Table 3.2
Test Results o f the Null Hypothesis of the Equalities between the Rejection
Rates of //»: P £, < 0 and H$: PEi > 0 for the 500 Random Pairs of Event and
Pseudo Samples
This tabic presents the rejection rates or the null hypothesis o f the equalities between the rejection
rates of H0: PE, < 0 and H0: PE, > 0 for the 500 random pairs o f event and pseudo samples during
the sample period o f July 1973 through December 1997. We first construct 500 random pairs o f
event and pseudo samples from the population o f all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ ordinary
common stocks in the 1997 CRSP monthly files at one*, three-, and five-year horizons. Following
Shumway (1997) and Shumway' and Warther (1998), we adjust return observations for the delisting
bias to mitigate survivorship bias. Monte Carlo realizations of bootstrap samples are then
independently generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap pricing errors for each event and pseudo stock.
By the bootstrap tests, we obtain the rejection rates o f the null hypothesis //0: PE, < 0 and / / 0: PE,
> 0 for each event and pseudo sample. With the 500 pairs o f rejection rates for H0: PE, < 0 and
for ff0: PE, > 0. we then apply the one-tailed Z-test for the equality between rejection rates to each
pair of observations. The number reported are the rejection rates o f the 500 Z-tests.
Theoretical Significance Level
1%

5%
The Null Hypothesis

H0: PE, < 0

ff«: PE, > 0

H0'. PE, < 0

H 0: PE, > 0

Panel A. Z-Test with 1% level of Significance
One-Year Horizon

0.8

0.2

0.8

0.8

Three-Year Horizon

2.0*

0.6

1.2

0.8

Five-Year Horizon

0.8

1.4

1.6

0.8

Panel B. Z-Test with 5% level of Significance
One-Year Horizon

5.4

6.8

5.6

5.6

Three-Year Horizon

6.0

5.4

5.0

4.6

Five-Year Horizon

5.0

7.2*

5.6

4.2

♦Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed (Bernoulli process)
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That is, we should expect that there is a 95% probability that the rejection rates of
the N Z-tests will fall into the 95% confidence interval o f a ± 1.96 x crBemoutu. (a. i-a>.
As table 3.2 shows, among the 24 rejection rates, two rejection rates are significantly
different from the 5% level of significance. Overall, these results suggest that the
long-term performance evaluation framework is well-specified under the null
hypothesis. The rejection rates appear to be independent of the length o f time
horizon. This implies that the long-term performance evaluation framework is free
from the aggregation problems in many long-term performance tests in which the
rejection o f the null hypothesis is more severe when the time horizon is longer.
3 .4 .2 P o w e r

The power of our long-term performance evaluation framework is primarily
evaluated by artificially introducing a constant level of abnormal return to each of the
available returns o f event stocks. Following Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon,
Barber, and Tsai (1999), we add ±0.42% (5%/12), ±0.84% (10%/12), ±1.26%
( 15%/l 2), and ±1.68% (20%/12) to each event stock’s monthly returns to obtain
induced levels o f annual abnormal returns o f ±5%, ±10%, ±15%, and ±20%,
respectively. We then document the empirical rejection rates of the null hypothesis
o f the equalities between the bootstrap rejection rates o f H0: PE, < 0 or H0. PE, > 0
for the 500 random pairs of event and pseudo samples.
In table 3 .3, the power o f our long-term performance evaluation framework
is evaluated for the one-year horizon at the 5% level of significance for the bootstrap
tests and the Z-tests. We chose the one-year horizon and the 5% level o f significance
because we would like to compare our framework with the existing methods whose
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Table 3.3
Power or the Tests of the Null Hypothesis of the Equalities between the
Rejection Rates of #/«: PEi < 0 and //«: PEi > 0 for the 500 Random Pairs o f
Event and Pseudo Samples at One-Year Horizon
This tabic presents the power o f the tests of the null hypothesis of the equalities between the
rejection rates of H0: PE, < 0 and H0: PE, > 0 for the 500 random pairs of event and pseudo
samples at one-year horizon during the sample period o f July 1973 through December 1997. We
first construct 500 random pairs o f event and pseudo samples from the population of all NYSE.
AMEX, and NASDAQ ordinary' common stocks in the 1997 CRSP monthly files. Following
Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1998). we adjust return observations for the delisting
bias to mitigate survivorship bias. We then add ±0.42% (5%/12), ±0.84% (10%/12). ±1.26%
( 15%/12). and ±1.68% (20%/I2) to each event stock's monthly returns to obtain induced levels of
annual abnormal returns o f ±5%. ±10%. ±15%. and ±20%. respectively. We then document the
empirical rejection rates at the 5% level of significance of the null hypothesis of the equalities
between the bootstrap rejection rates of H0: PE, < 0 or H0: PE, > 0 for the 500 random pairs o f
event and pseudo samples at different levels of induced abnormal returns. The power results in
panel B and C arc from Barber and Lyon (1997. table 6 and 8).
-5
0
Induced Level of Abnormal Return (%)
+5 +10
-20 -15 -10
Panel A. Power of the Long-Term Performance Ev aluation Framework Based on the GLPM
Z-Tcsts
17
6
47
19
88
65
38
Panel B. Power of r-Statistics Using CARs
Reference Portfolios
Size Deciles
35
5
87
99
98
82
32
36
4
30
99
98
84
86
Book-to-Markct Deciles
87
36
5
99
98
84
32
Sizc/Book-to-Markct Portfolios
5
97
76
25
39
91
Equally Weighted Market Index
99
Control Firm Approach
17
19
5
Size-Matched Control Firm
98
89
59
56
6
17
98
88
58
21
54
Book-to-Markct Matched Control Firm
20
4
15
89
60
56
Sizc/Book-to-Markct Matched Control Firm 98
7
88
66
28
96
9
32
Fama-Frcnch Three-Factor Model a s
Panel C. Power of /-Statistics Using BHARs
Reference Portfolios
Size Deciles
77
9
97
91
42
57
11
10
97
44
92
79
9
55
Book-to-Markct Deciles
10
10
97
78
44
56
Sizc/Book-to-Markct Portfolios
92
8
14
96
90
35
66
Equally Weighted Market Index
72
Control Firm Approach
14
5
14
76
45
44
Size-Matched Control Firm
91
17
4
75
46
42
Book-to-Markct Matched Control Firm
91
13
47
3
76
15
13
43
Sizc/Book-to-Markct Matched Control Firm 92
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+15

+20

81

97

100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100

86
86
87
66

98
97
98
87

96
95
96
97

100
100
100
100

74
72
74

91
90
91

power issues are extensively examined by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber,
and Tsai (1999) who use one-year monthly returns in random samples at the 5%
level o f significance. As table 3 .3 shows, the power of our long-term performance
evaluation framework is quite similar to the power o f the Fama-French three-factor
model under the alternative hypothesis. However, the Fama-French three-factor
model is shown by Barber and Lyon (1997) to yield negatively biased test statistics
under the null hypothesis at one- and three- year horizons, while our framework is
demonstrated in the previous subsection to be well-specified under the null
hypothesis regardless of the length o f time horizon.
We are interested in comparing our long-term performance evaluation
framework to the control firm approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997).
Barber and Lyon show that the control firm approach is well-specified under the null
hypothesis. We find that our framework and the control firm approach have similar
power when the control firm approach uses the buy-and-hold abnormal return
(BHAR) metric which Barber and Lyon favor on conceptual grounds. Therefore,
our framework is doing at least as well as the control firm approach in a statistical
sense. The power o f the control firm approach, bootstrapped skewness-adjusted tstatistic, empirical /J-value, and our long-term performance evaluation framework is
depicted graphically in figure 3.1. The similarity in power is evident in the figure.
More importantly, on theoretical grounds, as Loughran and Ritter (2000)
argue, a positive benchmark controlling for size and book-to-market, such as the
control firm approach o f Barber and Lyon (1997), can only be used to test whether,
other than size and book-to-market, another pattern exists. In this regard, we favor
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Figure 3.1 The power o f the long-term performance evaluation framework
based on the GLPM. The percentage o f S00 random samples o f 200 firms rejecting
the null hypothesis at one-year horizon under the alternative hypothesis at various
induced levels o f annual abnormal returns (-20% to +20%) based on the GLPM.
The power of the control firm approach, bootstrapped skewness-adjusted /-statistic,
and empirical p values is from Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999).
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the long-term performance evaluation framework based on the GLPM because the
GLPM is a normative, equilibrium model. Similarly, although the use o f the
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted /-statistic and empirical /rvalue in Lyon, Barber,
and Tsai (1999) improves the power, these tw o methods are subject to the same
theoretical pitfall since they still rely on using size and book-to-market to generate
expected returns. Therefore, although the power o f the long-term performance
evaluation based on the GLPM is slightly lower than the power of the bootstrapped
skewness-adjusted /-statistic and the empirical />-value method, we believe that this
framework is sound and competitive in a theoretical and conceptual sense.
In addition to the introduction o f a constant level o f abnormal return to each
of the available returns o f event stocks, the power o f our long-term evaluation
framework can be empirically evaluated by applying it to a known long-term
anomaly. The idea is that if the framework is universally without power, then the
framework will be unable to detect an anomaly even if the anomaly is robust. By the
same token, if the framework is able to verify an anomaly for which the existing
empirical results are mixed, we can be more confident about the power o f the
framework. In the following section, we chose IPOs to empirically evaluate the
power of our long-term performance evaluation framework because the existing
evidence regarding the underperformance of IPOs is mixed.
3.5 An Application: IPOs
After analyzing the statistical properties o f our long-term performance
evaluation framework, we apply this framework to the underperformance o f IPOs
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documented by Ritter (1991). We first review the underperformance o f IPOs. The
sample is then briefly discussed. Finally, the test results are reported.
3.5.1 The Long-Term Underperformance of IPOs
Ritter (1991) documents that IPO firms significantly underperform relative to
non-IPO firms for three years after the offering date. Ritter argues that this
underperformance is consistent with an IPO market in which investors are
periodically, systematically overoptimistic about the prospects o f IPO firms, and
firms take advantage o f these windows o f opportunity. This IPO long-term
underperformance has also been confirmed by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995).
Some studies argue that the long-term underperformance o f IPOs is sensitive
to the return metric. Brav and Gompers (1997) show that the underperformance
disappears when the benchmarks control for size as well as book-to-market ratio.
Brav and Gompers also find that when IPOs are value-weighted, instead o f equalweighted, five-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns shrink significantly. Fama (1998)
argues that the underperformance is not robust to alternative methods and, therefore,
the paradigm o f market efficiency should not be abandoned.
Recently, Loughran and Ritter (2000) have demonstrated that the valueweighting scheme has low power in detecting abnormal returns when the event being
studied is a managerial choice variable, such as IPOs. Furthermore, they show that
IPO firms reliably underperform on both an equal-weighted and a value-weighted
basis when the Fama-French (1993) three-factor regressions are run using factors
that have been purged o f IPOs to mitigate the benchmark contamination problem. In
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short, the evidence regarding the underperformance o f IPOs is mixed, and the debate
on market efficiency appears to have no end in the near future.
3.5.2 The Sample
The IPO sample is from Ritter (1991). The sample comprises 1,525 IPOs
that went public in the 1975-1984 period.17 The post-event window includes the
following 36 months where months are defined as successive 21-trading-day periods
relative to the IPO date. For IPOs that are delisted in the post-event window, the
data set uses the available return series and is adjusted for the delisting bias to
mitigate survivorship bias (Shumway (1997), Shumway and Warther (1998)).
We construct a pseudo sample of 1,525 non-IPO stocks. For each IPO
sample stock, a pseudo stock with the delisting return adjusted is randomly selected
such that the pseudo stock has return observations that cover the beginning o f the
IPO sample stock’s post-event window. This procedure is repeated to obtain a
pseudo sample o f 1,525 non-IPO stocks.
3.5.3 Test Results
We apply the bootstrap method to each o f the 1,525 IPO sample stocks and
to each o f the 1,525 pseudo stocks. Table 3 .4 presents the test results. In panel A,
the rejection rates of H0: PE, < 0 and H0: PE, > 0 for the IPO sample are 1.38% and
5 .64%, respectively, at the 1% level o f significance. It is clear that IPOs tend to have
long-term negative performance. Similarly, at the 5% level o f significance, the
rejection rate of H0: PE, > 0, 12.66%, is much higher than that o f H0: PE, < 0,

' One of Ritter's (1991) sample, whose CRSP permanent number is 11077. is excluded because it
no return observations in the 1997 CRSP daily flics.

has
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Table 3.4
Test Results o f the Null Hypothesis of the Equality between the Bootstrap
Rejection Rates for the IPO and Pseudo Samples
This tabic presents test results of the null hypothesis o f the equality of the bootstrap rejection rates
for the IPO and pseudo samples. The IPO sample is from Ritter (1991). Following Shumway
(1997) and Shumway and Warther (1998). the data set is adjusted for the delisting bias. For each
IPO sample stock, a pseudo stock with the delisting return adjusted is randomly selected such that
the return scries o f the pseudo stock covers the beginning of the IPO sample stock's three-year postcvcnt window-. The restricted sample exclude those stocks whose return series is shorter than 12
montlis. Another set o f test results without the delisting returns adjusted is also reported. Monte
Carlo realizations o f bootstrap samples are then independently generated to obtain 1.000 bootstrap
pricing errors for each stock. The empirical distribution o f these bootstrap pricing errors is used to
construct the bootstrap critical values. We then apply the Z-test for the equality between rejection
rates to the IPO and pseudo samples.
Theoretical Significance Level
1%

5%

# of
Stocks

The Null Hypothesis
//0: PE, < 0

Hn: PE, > 0

//„: PE, < 0

H0: PE, > 0

Panel A. Ritter's (1991) Sample
IPO Sample

1525

1.38

5.64

5.05

12.66

Pseudo Sample

1525

2.16

2.62

8.66

7.87

4.19*

Z-Test Statistic

4.36*

Panel B. Restricted Sample (A Minimum of 12-Month Return Observations)
IPO Sample

1380

1.74

Pseudo Sample

1380

2.57

5.72
2.57

5.43
8.95

4.15*

Z-Tcst Statistic

13.25
8.66
3.86*

Panel C. Ritter's (1991) Sample without the Delisting Bias Adjustment
IPO Sample

1525

1.38

4.26

5.38

11.48

Pseudo Sample

1525

2.17

2.62

8.68

7.86

2.48*

Z-Tcst Statistic

3.38*

Panel D. Restricted Sample without the Delisting Bias Adjustment
IPO Sample
Pseudo Sample

1380
1380

1.88
2.57

4.49

5.87

12.25

2.57

8.88

8.62

2.73*

Z-Tcst Statistic
* Significant at the 1% level of significance, one-tailed
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3.12*

5.05%. In contrast, the rejection rates o f Ho- PE, < 0 and H0. PE, > 0 for the
pseudo sample are closer to each other, and not far from the specified levels of
significance. Applying the Z-test for the equality between the rejection rates of Ho.
PE, > 0 for the IPO and pseudo samples, the test statistics, 4.19 for the bootstrap
rejection rate at the 1% level o f significance and 4.36 for the bootstrap rejection rate
at the 5% level of significance, are significant at the 1% level for the Z-tests. These
results suggest that the risk-retum tradeoff in the IPO sample is different from the
risk-retum tradeoff in the random pseudo sample.
These results also not sensitive to whether we impose a minimum
requirement for the number o f monthly return observations on the IPO sample
stocks. Among the 1,525 IPO sample stocks, 9.50% of them are delisted within 12
months subsequent to their IPO dates. Since the return observations are limited for
these short-lived IPO stocks, one might question whether inferences based on these
return observations are robust. To address this concern, we exclude those IPO
sample stocks whose monthly returns series is less than 12 months and obtain a
subset of 1.380 IPO sample stocks.18 The test results on this restricted sample are
reported in panel B of table 3 .4. It is clear that the rejection rates for both the
restricted IPO and the correspondent pseudo samples and the Z-statistics do not
change much after imposing the 12-month-retum restriction.
The conclusions favoring the window o f opportunity argument o f Ritter
(1991) are also invariant to whether we take the delisting bias into consideration. In
the existing studies, including Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and
lx Results based on different cutoffs arc similar.
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Affleck-Graves (1995), and Loughran and Ritter (2000), the delisting bias has not
been adjusted. Consequently, one might argue that the test results presented in this
study are driven by the missing return adjustment. To investigate this possibility, we
exclude the adjusted delisting returns from our initial and restricted IPO and pseudo
samples. The test results, shown in panel C and D, indicate that although the
adjustment o f the delisting returns makes the underperformance more severe, the
initial and restricted IPO samples still appear to underperform even without the
adjustment. The Z-test statistics, ranging from 2.48 to 3.38, are still significant at the
1% level of significance.
In short, the IPO long-term performance evaluation based on the GLPM is
consistent with the previously documented underperformance (Ritter (1991),
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), and Loughran and
Ritter (2000)). The result is based on a statistic that is well-specified under the null
hypothesis and is o f power under the alternative hypothesis. The major difference
between this study and the existing studies is that our long-term evaluation
framework has a theoretical foundation for testing market efficiency because the
statistic is based on a normative (equilibrium) asset pricing model.
3.6 Conclusions
In this essay, we analyze the long-term performance evaluation framework
based on the GLPM. The GLPM is a normative (equilibrium) model with economic
intuition and robustness. This study is in the line with the advocacy of Loughran and
Ritter (2000) that long-term performance evaluation requires a normative
(equilibrium) asset pricing model. In addition, this evaluation framework uses
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bootstrap tests on an individual stock basis to mitigate the skewness problem o f
abnormal return distributions and avoid the aggregation problems in many long-term
performance tests. Our simulation results show that this evaluation framework is
well-specified and is o f power.
We apply our long-term performance evaluation framework to Ritter’s
(1991) IPO sample. Consistent with Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995),
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), and Loughran and Ritter (2000), we document
that, according to the normative risk-retum tradeoff of GLPM, IPO firms
underperform in their three-year post-event windows. Since this is the first
application o f the normative (equilibrium) GLPM in long-term performance
evaluation, it would be interesting to see how other long-term anomalies behave
under this long-term performance evaluation framework. We hope that this study
can motivate future research in this direction.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation provides an empirical examination o f the GLPM, in which
loss aversion is intuitively incorporated into investors’ portfolio decisions. In the
GLPM equilibrium, the risk-retum relation is based on the tradeoff between expected
market-related gain and loss. In addition to its rich economic intuition, the GLPM is
shown to be more robust than the mean-variance-based CAPM.
The bootstrap method is used to test asset pricing on an individual asset
basis. First, the empirical power o f the GLPM is examined for each sample stock.
The testing framework used in this study imposes a higher testing standard and
places no restrictions on the distribution o f the statistic with the use o f the bootstrap.
The results show that the mean rejection rates o f the GLPM are 2.03% and 7.04%
for the 1% and 5% levels o f significance, respectively, during the 1948-1997 sample
period. The highest rejection rates in the 10 five-year test periods are 3 .07% and
8.18% for the 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. Given the allowable
level of the 1% and 5% levels o f significance and the randomness in the level of the
type-I errors, no more than 3% o f sample stocks are mispriced. These results
indicate that the GLPM appears to do a good job o f explaining stock returns.
Second, based on these testing results, a long-term performance evaluation
framework based on the normative (equilibrium) GLPM is proposed. This
investigation is in the line with Loughran and Ritter’s (2000) argument that long
term performance evaluation requires a normative (equilibrium) asset pricing model.
This evaluation framework based on the bootstrap method is also capable of
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mitigating the skewness problem o f abnormal return distributions and avoiding the
aggregation problems in many long-term performance tests. The specification o f the
long-term performance evaluation framework is evaluated using samples o f randomly
selected NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks and simulated random event dates.
Simulation results show that the long-term performance evaluation framework based
on the normative (equilibrium) GLPM is well-specified.
Overall, this dissertation provides empirical evidence in favor o f the empirical
power o f the GLPM in explaining asset returns and in evaluating long-term
performance. Because o f its explanatory ability, it appears that the use o f the GLPM
in generating expected returns for empirical applications should be promising.
Consequently, a future analysis of the use o f the GLPM in determining the cost o f
capital for risky budgeting projects would be worthwhile.
In addition, based on the CAPM, researchers have identified a number o f
anomalies in asset prices. Empirical anomalies can arise from several sources, such
as market frictions, false inferences of the risk-retum relationship, inappropriate risk
measures, and mispricing by market participants. The empirical results based on the
GLPM, on the other hand, suggest that there are not many mispriced stocks. For
future research, it would be interesting to apply the GLPM to re-examine these
anomalies.
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